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Applying the Break:
Religion and the Peremptory Challenge
J. SUZANNE BELL CHAMBERS*
INTRODUCTION
The foundation of the American legal system consists of rights, and those
rights are brought to life by a diverse array of procedures and processes.
Among these procedures is the peremptory challenge, a tool of jury selection
which has been an integral component of American judicial history. However,
the challenge is currently undergoing extensive examination as courts attempt
to determine whether equal protection principles should shape its nature and
use, and, if so, in what manner and to what extent. Ultimately, the debate
regarding the proper nature and scope of the peremptory challenge is rooted
in the fact that it pits two important rights against one another: the litigants'
right to an impartial jury, and the excluded juror's right to be free from
unlawful discrimination.
Over the past nine years, the United States Supreme Court has resolved this
debate in certain isolated contexts. In its landmark holding in Batson v.
Kentucky' and the series of opinions which followed, the Court dictated that
the peremptory challenge may not be used in a racially discriminatory manner.
In 1994, the Court extended its examination of the constitutional limits on the
use of the peremptory challenge to the context of gender. In J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 2 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection guarantee prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges on the
basis of gender.
In the wake of J.E.B., questions still abound. Scholars will likely engage in
theoretical debates regarding the propriety of the Court's ruling. Lower courts
are left to the task of implementing the holding, though the way in which
lower courts have implemented Batson provides ample guidance. The most
critical question that must be resolved, however, is whether and to what extent
the holding in J.E.B. should be applied in other contexts.3 More specifically,
now that our nation's highest court has resolved the issue of whether the
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1992, Indiana
University. I would like to thank Professor Daniel 0. Conkle for his valuable insights and assistance.
I would also like to express my sincerest gratitude to my parents, Jan and Ron Bell, and to my husband,
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1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
3. Indeed, some lower courts had already considered the applicability of Batson in contexts other
than race even before the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered its decision inJ.E.B. See, e.g.,
United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990) (extending Batson to gender and thus ruling
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges based on gender); United States v.
Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that Batson does not apply to gender-based
peremptory challenges); United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that Batson does
not preclude peremptory challenges based on age), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); State v. Culver,
444 N.W.2d 662 (Neb. 1989) (refusing to extend Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges).
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Equal Protection Clause bars peremptory challenges based upon gender, lower
courts will increasingly face the argument that religion-based peremptory
strikes are similarly constitutionally impermissible.
This Note argues that an extension of Batson and J.E.B. to the context of
religion is neither constitutionally warranted nor practically desirable. Part I
includes a discussion of the nature of trial by jury and the jury selection
process. Part I explains how parties go about exercising their right to trial by
jury. Part II focuses on the history of the peremptory challenge and examines
the functions that the peremptory challenge performs. Part II also discusses
recent Supreme Court decisions which have shaped the use of the peremptory
challenge and outlines the present debate over extending those decisions to
other contexts. Part III explores the nature of the current issue regarding the
applicability of limitations on the free, uninhibited use of the peremptory in
the context of religion. Part III presents the constitutional considerations and
practical implications which must be taken into account when considering
whether religion-based peremptory challenges should be prohibited. This Note
concludes by arguing against any proposed restrictions on the exercise of
religion-based peremptory challenges by suggesting that the right to an
impartial jury must prevail.
I. THE MAKING OF A JURY
Before exploring the nature of the peremptory challenge, its functions, how
it has been shaped by constitutional principles, and whether courts should
prohibit peremptory challenges based upon religion, a general overview of the
jury selection process and the place the peremptory challenge holds in that
process is useful. Trial by jury has long been a revered right in the American
judicial system. Indeed, one of the grievances that the authors of the
Declaration of Independence cited was the King's insistence on depriving the
colonists of this right; thus, the right to a jury trial was "among the rights of
Englishmen for which the revolution was fought."4 The inclusion of this right
in our nation's Constitution further demonstrates its importance. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury to those charged with
crimes,5 while the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in
civil cases in which such a right existed at common law.6
While jury trials form the basis of our judicial system, these trials in turn
are based upon jury selection methods.' The task of seating a jury involves
three basic phases.' In phase one, a list of prospective jurors is compiled.9
4. V. HALE STARR & MARK McCoRMicK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATrORNEY's GUIDE TO JURY
LAW AND METHODS § 1.0 (2d ed. 1993).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
7. See 1 ANN FAGAN GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS §§ 1.1-2.46
(1984).
8. Id. § 2.1.
9. Id. While states may differ in how they actually form jury pools, lists of registered voters,
licensed drivers, and utility customers are commonly utilized. STARR & McCoRMICK, supra note 4, at§ 2.4. Federal law provides that the names of prospective jurors are to be chosen from actual voting lists
and permits supplementation with other lists. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
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In the second phase, the court excuses some of these prospective jurors for
reasons such as inability to speak the English language, physical and/or
mental infirmity, age, and occupation." The group which remains, called the
venire, then reports to the courthouse, where the final stage of the jury
selection procedure, voir dire, takes place.
Voir dire is the primary mechanism by which the group that will ultimately
hear the case is empaneled. According to one commentary, "[L]awyers have
come to believe, with apparent justification, that trials are often won or lost
at this stage of the trial process."" Voir dire involves a process whereby the
prospective jurors are questioned so that the court and the parties can
ascertain any potential biases or prejudices that may prevent the jurors from
impartially receiving and weighing the evidence. 2 Courts assume that all
jurors have the ability to be impartial and to set aside their preconceived
notions; the purpose of voir dire is to test that assumption. The goal of
achieving impartiality is accomplished by permitting the parties to challenge
prospective jurors in one of two ways: the challenge for cause and the
peremptory challenge. Through the jurors' responses during voir dire,
attorneys gather the information they need to exercise intelligently these
challenges. 3 Voir dire thus becomes a vehicle through which a party's
constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury is secured.
Challenges for cause and peremptory challenges bear many similarities. A
successful challenge of either type results in a juror's being excused from
serving. In addition, both the challenge for cause and the peremptory
challenge are creatures of statute and are available in both criminal and civil
cases.
14
Here, however, the similarities between the two types of challenges end. At
both the state and federal level, challenges for cause are unlimited in their
10. 1 GINGER, supra note 7, §§ 2.31-.32.
11. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 3.83. One practitioner recalls a case in which it took
five weeks to select a jury, while it took only four weeks to present the evidence. Patrick A. Tuite, Voir
Dire with a Blindfold, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 25, 1994, at 6.
12. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 10.0. State and federal courts differ in the ways in
which such questioning may be conducted. In the federal system, judge-conducted voir dire is prevalent.
Id. § 10.0, at 242. In some state jurisdictions, attorneys are given the responsibility of questioning the
venire. See Id. § 10.0, at 243. Finally, in some state courts, both the trial judge and attorneys participate,
with the judge initiating the process by conducting a general examination of the jurors. See id. § 10.0,
at 246.
13. Attorneys may have at their disposal other information about each prospective juror prior to
entering the courtroom. Most courts, both in the states and in the federal system, require those whose
names are drawn as prospective jurors to complete a questionnaire. 2 GINGER, supra note 7, § 12.1.
Some attorneys conduct formal investigations to gather information about prospective jurors. See 2 id.
§§ 13.1-.20 (discussing the use ofjury investigation teams made up of volunteers); ARNE WERCHICK,
CIVIL JURY SELECrION § 5.2 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the use of professional researchers in the jury
selection process). But see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-30 (1980) ("Vexatious
or harassing investigations of veniremen or jurors seriously impair the effectiveness of ourjury system.
For this reason, a lawyer or anyone on his behalf who conducts an investigation of veniremen or jurors
should act with circumspection and restraint.").
14. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
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number. 5 However, challenges for cause are not automatic; the trial judge
must be satisfied that the requisite showing has been made before excusing
a juror for cause.' 6 Such a challenge requires that the exercising party "show
that a pervasive bias exists that violates the parties' 'right to an impartial
jury.""..7 The type of bias which warrants a challenge for cause may be either
implied or actual.' A claim of implied bias might arise by virtue of a
relationship between the prospective juror and a party, witness, or victim.'9
Actual bias exists when, due to a preconceived notion about the case, parties,
or witnesses, a prospective juror appears unable to act impartially and without
prejudice.20 Even if a juror appears to be biased, however, the judge may
still deny a challenge for cause and allow the juror to serve if the judge is
convinced that the juror can be fair and impartial despite his apparent bias.2'
On the other hand, the peremptory challenge "permits a party to excuse a
juror for any reason that the party sees fit, or for no reason at all. ' 22 The
nature of the peremptory challenge therefore provides a sharp contrast to that
of the challenge for cause: "While challenges for cause permit rejection of
jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of
partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality
that is less easily designated or demonstrable. '23 In many instances, the
grounds upon which peremptory challenges are based are those "normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings. ' 24 Thus, in exercising this type of
challenge, attorneys often rely upon suspicion, experience, stereotypes, and
instinct. 25 State and federal statutes therefore restrict the number of peremp-
tory challenges available to each party.26 In summing up the nature of the
peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court has thus described it as a challenge
15. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 11.4.1.
16. Seeid. § 2.11.
17. Id. § 11.4.1 (quoting United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972)).
18. 1 GINGER, supra note 7, § 8.2.
19. 1 id.
20. 1 id.
21. STARR & McCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 11.4.1.
22. JAMEs J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART, AND SCIENCE OF
SELECTING A JURY 269 (2d ed. 1990). Of course, this definition has been modified by Batson and J.E.B.
As a result of those holdings, a reason must be given for exercising peremptory challenges when a prima
facie showing of race or gender discrimination has been made. See infra part II.B.l-2.
23. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70
(1887)), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
24. Id.
25. SAUL M. KASsiN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 24 (1988).
26. For instance, federal law provides that each party in a civil case is entitled to exercise three
peremptory challenges. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). In criminal cases, three peremptories may be exercised
by each side if a misdemeanor is charged, while felony charges warrant ten peremptories for the
defendant and six for the prosecution. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). State statutes vary widely in the number
of peremptory challenges they permit. I GINGER, supra note 7, § 8.5. In the State of Indiana, each party
to a civil action may exercise three peremptory challenges. IND. CODE § 34-1-20.5-3(a) (1994). The
number of peremptory challenges in criminal cases varies depending on the crime. If the defendant is
charged with capital murder, the prosecution and defense may each exercise twenty peremptory
challenges. Id. § 35-37-1-3(a) (1994). In cases involving noncapital murder and class A, B, or C
felonies, each side may exercise ten peremptory challenges. Id. § 35-37-1-3(b) (1994). For all other
crimes, five peremptory challenges per side are permitted. Id. § 35-37-1-3(c) (1994).
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which may be exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without
being subject to the court's control."2
II. THE LIFE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
In order to evaluate the propriety of precluding the exercise of religion-
based peremptory challenges, it is important to understand the history of the
challenge and the various functions it performs in the jury trial process. Part
II.A addresses these issues and explains why some commentators view the
peremptory challenge as an integral component of trial by jury. Part II.B then
traces the way in which the Supreme Court has recently changed the nature
of the peremptory challenge in the contexts of race and gender. Part II.B also
suggests that religion will be the next juror attribute that parties will argue is
an unconstitutional basis for exercising a peremptory challenge.
A. The History and Functions of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge has deep and significant historical roots. In
praising its purposes and functions, both the Supreme Court and commentators
have made note of the peremptory's "very old credentials. '28 The origin of
the peremptory challenge can be traced as far back as Roman times, when, in
104 B.C., the Lex Servilia permitted each party to a dispute to call one
hundred triers and to reject fifty of those summoned by the other.29 The
common law of England incorporated the peremptory challenge where, in
criminal actions, peremptory challenges "on both sides became the settled
law."30 Early in the formative years of the United States, the peremptory
challenge was a sanctioned and recognized aspect of trial by jury. The federal
system ratified its use as early as 1790 by statutorily allowing a defendant
accused of treason to exercise thirty-five peremptory challenges; defendants
charged with offenses punishable by death were permitted to exercise twenty
peremptory challenges.3 States quickly followed suit, enacting statutes
governing the number and use of peremptory challenges.32 By 1965, all
states had enacted statutes requiring that a certain number of peremptory
challenges be given to parties in both civil and criminal cases.3
Not only has the peremptory challenge been noted for its historical use and
acceptance, but its purposes and the functions it performs have caused it to
be recognized by courts and commentators alike as a significant, valuable, and
integral aspect of the jury selection process. Over a century ago, John Proffatt
27. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 212. Justice White's majority opinion in Swain incorporates an extensive and detailed
review of the history of the peremptory challenge in England and the United States. See id. at 212-19.
29. WLLIAM FoRsYTH, HIsTORY OF T iAL BY JuRY 145 (New York, James Cockcroft & Co.
1875).
30. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
31. Id. at 214.
32. Id. at 215.
33. Id. at 217.
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described the peremptory challenge as "highly esteemed and protected in
law. '3 4 While the Supreme Court has held that the right to peremptorily
challenge prospective jurors is itself not one of constitutional proportions,35
the peremptory challenge has been regarded as an essential means of
safeguarding a right that is constitutionally recognized and protected-the
right to an impartial jury.36 Of course, the entire process of voir dire serves
this purpose because voir dire allows the court and parties to attempt to
uncover any prejudices and biases that might prevent a prospective juror from
being impartial.3" Nevertheless, because parties can exercise a peremptory
challenge without stating a reason, it has been viewed as an especially
effective and necessary mechanism through which a party's constitutional
right to an impartial jury is realized. Over one hundred years ago, William
Forsyth commented, "The right of challenge is almost essential for the
purpose of securing perfect fairness and impartiality in a trial."3 And it was
at this same point in history, that the Supreme Court described the peremptory
challenge as "essential to the fairness of trial by jury."39 Although not a
constitutional right, the Court found the peremptory challenge to be suffi-
ciently important in Swain v. Alabama" to hold that, even absent a showing
of prejudice; denial or impairment of this right would constitute reversible
error.
4 1
There are several ways in which the nature of the peremptory challenge
contributes to the empaneling of an impartial jury. Allowing the free use of
the challenge permits parties to "eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides. '42 The challenge for cause cannot be fully relied upon to eliminate
such partiality because trial judges strictly construe it; generally, it is
"narrowly confined to instances in which threats to impartiality are admitted
or presumed from the relationships, pecuniary interests, or clear biases of a
34. JOHN PRoFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURy § 155 (1877).
35. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). The authors of the Sixth Amendment
did consider including the right to peremptorily challenge jurors in the Constitution. This provision was
eliminated, however, because the authors felt that the impartial jury guarantee included in the Sixth
Amendment encompassed the right to question and challenge jurors. Barbara L. Horwitz, Comment, The
Extinction of the Peremptory Challenge: What Will the Jury System Lose by Its Demise?, 61 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1391, 1397 (1993).
36. See Thomas A. Hett, Batson v. Kentucky: Present Extensions and Future Applications, 24 LToy.
U. CHI. L.J. 413, 413 (1993); Robert T. Prior, The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, 44 MERCER
L. REV. 579, 579 (1993). The Sixth Amendment expressly secures for the criminally accused the right
to an impartial jury: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury... ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has also recognized
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment confers upon civil litigants the constitutional right
to an impartial jury. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("The Due Process
Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.").
37. See STARR & McCoRMICK, supra note 4, §§ 9.0-.1.1.
38. FORSYTH, supra note 29, at 145.
39. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
40. 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Id. at 219.
42. Id.
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prospective juror. '43 Thus, in the pursuit of an impartial jury, the peremptory
challenge serves as a supplement to the challenge for cause.
The peremptory challenge also functions in some instances as a substitute
for the challenge for cause. During voir dire, a situation may arise in which
an attorney has a legitimate concern about a prospective juror's ability to be
fair and impartial; however, the attorney may not be able to precisely pinpoint
and articulate this concern so as to warrant a challenge for cause.44 In such
a situation, the attorney can employ the peremptory challenge where the
challenge for cause might not succeed in eliminating the potentially partial
juror from the panel.45
In addition, an attorney may also attempt to lay the foundation for a
challenge for cause through probing voir dire questioning, but the court might
then deny the challenge. In the process, the attorney's effort may have
engendered hostility-and thereby invited partiality-in the particular juror to
whom the questions were directed. The peremptory challenge can be used in
this situation to prevent this from occurring by serving as a "shield" against
such failed challenges for cause. If the trial judge denies a challenge for cause
against this juror after the attorney has engaged in such intensive questioning,
the party who questioned the juror can excuse the juror by -exercising a
peremptory challenge.46 When used in this manner, the peremptory challenge
can shield the exercising party from any potential hostility felt by the juror
as a result of the potentially intrusive, alienating, and probing nature of the
questioning. 47 Because an attorney knows that he can peremptorily challenge
a juror whom he feels his questioning has alienated, the attorney will be
encouraged to put aside the hesitation he might otherwise feel to inquire
vigorously and deeply into the potential biases of prospective jurors.48
Since by its nature the peremptory challenge requires no explanation, it
performs other valuable functions besides helping to achieve the judicial
system's goal of seating an impartial jury. For instance, the availability of the
peremptory challenge encourages parties to have more confidence in and
respect for the process which they have chosen to resolve their dispute. The
peremptory challenge serves as a sort of "token," representing to the litigants
43. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981).
44. See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
In Davis, the court gave as an example a situation in which a juror may express doubt about his ability
to be fair but is "rehabilitated" by subsequent questioning from opposing counsel or the judge. Id.
45. In this respect, few would likely argue that the peremptory challenge is a perfect tool for
screening partiality out of the jury system. Indeed, the exercise of a peremptory might actually result
in an impartial juror being excused. Nevertheless, the importance of the right to an impartial jury
justifies incurring the cost of such an occasional occurrence: "The fact that some unbiased jurors may
be excused in the process is an affordable price to pay for removing doubts about a particular juror's
impartiality and competence, especially when the vote of one unbiased juror can make a critical
difference." Id.
46. See STAmi & McCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 11.4.3.
47. Id.
48. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 770; see also Barbara A. Babcock, Jury Service and Community
Representation, in VERDICr: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 460, 479 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
("The peremptory challenge is the insurance that makes genuine inquiry into juror bias possible.").
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that their right to an impartial jury is not a hollow guarantee and does not lie
beyond their control.49 Affording parties the right to exercise these challenges
"demonstrates that the jury trial system is a just mode of dispute resolution
because it allows the litigant to be involved in selecting an impartial jury by
dismissing the jurors he or she does not like. '50 Blackstone recognized and
praised this quality of the peremptory challenge, noting that it "allows the
litigant to dismiss 'those he fears or hates the most, so that he is left with "a
good opinion of the jury, the want of which might totally disconcert
him.""' ' 51 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged this attribute of the
peremptory challenge:
The function of the challenge is ... to assure the parties that the jurors
before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence
placed before them, and not otherwise. In this way the peremptory. satisfies
the rule that "to perform its high function in the best way 'justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.' 5
In addition, because the exercise of a peremptory challenge requires no
explanation, an attorney can dismiss a juror without having to ask potentially
embarrassing questions of the juror.53 According to one author, the peremp-
tory challenge, made without giving any reason, also "avoids trafficking in the
core of truth in most common stereotypes .... [W]e have evolved in the
peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what we
dare not say but know is true more often than not. 5' The peremptory
challenge thus prevents the attorney from being required to make a general-
ized statement about a common stereotype of the group to which the juror
belongs and upon which the attorney may have based his decision to challenge
the juror."
B. The Changing Face of the Peremptory Challenge
In the short span of nine -years, the United States Supreme Court has
significantly altered the traditional nature of the peremptory challenge and
restrained its uninhibited use. The Court has held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the exercise of peremptory
challenges which are based upon race and gender. This Section discusses the
five Court rulings which have shaped the exercise of the peremptory challenge
and suggests that, because the Court has finally broken beyond the confines
49. See Prior, supra note 36, at 583 ("[T]he ability to remove extremes of partiality is an explicit
reminder of the right to an impartial jury.").
50. STARR & McCoRMicK, supra note 4, § 11.4.3 (footnote omitted).
51. Babcock, supra note 48, at 464 (quoting Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving 'Its
Wonderful Power', 27 STAN. L. REV. 545,552 (1975) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTAR-
IEs *353)).
52. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133, 136 (1955)), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
53. See STARR & McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, § 11.4.3.
54. Babcock, supra note 51, at 553-54 (footnote omitted).
55. STARR & McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, § 11.4.3.
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of race-based challenges, parties will now argue that the Constitution
precludes peremptory challenges based upon religion.
1. Batson and Its Progeny
The basic nature of the peremptory challenge in the United States was left
virtually untouched for over two hundred years.56 However, beginning in
1986, a series of Supreme Court decisions described by one author as a "small
revolution"5 7 altered the traditional nature of the peremptory challenge by
limiting its uninhibited, unsupervised use. Following the landmark case of
Batson v. Kentucky,58 a prosecutor in a criminal case could not peremptorily
challenge prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner. 59 Batson
held that such racially discriminatory challenges are inconsistent with the
defendant's equal protection rights under the Federal Constitution.6"
To assist lower courts in implementing its holding, the Court articulated a
test for determining when the exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude
members of a particular race would be classified as constitutionally prohibited
racial discrimination. To challenge the exercise of a peremptory challenge
under Batson, the defendant must first establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. To do so, the defendant must satisfy a series of
requirements. He "first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to
remove from the venire members of the defendant's race."'" To make this
showing, the defendant may "rely on the fact... that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are
of a mind to discriminate."' 62 Finally, to establish a prima facie case, the
defendant must demonstrate that, based upon the previous facts and all other
relevant circumstances, an inference arises "that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
race." 63 Ultimately, the Court noted, the trial judge, "experienced in
supervising voir dire," must determine if the defendant has satisfied this
56. In Swain, the Court did subject racially-based peremptory challenges to the mandates of the
Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the Court held that the State violated the Equal Protection Clause
if it purposefully and deliberately used peremptory challenges to eliminate African-Americans from the
jury. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04. However, the Court found that a successful equal protection challenge
required that the "defendant... show the prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against
Negroes over a period of time." Id. at 227. Thus, in theory, the decision in Swain meant that the use
of peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race was no longer without limitation. In
practice, however, Swain's rigorous evidentiary requirement provided continued immunization of a
prosecutor's peremptory strikes from constitutional scrutiny. See Prior, supra note 36, at 584-85. This
"crippling burden of proof" was later rejected by the Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92
(1986).
57. Marcia Coyle, High Court May Strike Sex-Based Challenges, NAT'L W., Nov. 8, 1993, at 27.
58. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 84.
61. Id. at 96 (citation omitted).
62. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
63. Id.
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burden and thereby created an inference that the prosecution has engaged in
purposeful discrimination. 4
While the Court refused to set forth particular procedural guidelines to be
used when a defendant objects to the State's challenges, 6 the Court did
explain the procedure to be followed once the judge has determined that the
defendant has made the requisite showing. A shifting of the burden occurs,
requiring the State to offer a race-neutral reason for challenging African-
American jurors.6 It was this aspect of the holding, as the Court itself noted,
that principally altered the traditional nature of the peremptory challenge:
"[T]his requirement imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory
character of the historic challenge."'67 According to the Court, although the
reason given "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause, ' 68 simply requiring any reason at all in this situation clashed directly
with the traditional definition of a peremptory challenge.
The Batson Court provided further limited guidance for prosecutors
regarding what would satisfy this new race-neutral requirement by articulating
a reason that would not be deemed permissible. The Court held that the
prosecutor's reason for challenging jurors of the defendant's race could not
be based "on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that they would be
partial to the defendant because of their shared race. '69 This shared identity
alone, the Court observed, would not be enough to support the prosecutor's
contention that a juror would be biased in favor of the defendant. 70 According
to the Court, general assertions of good faith and lack of a discriminatory
motive would also be insufficient to satisfy the race-neutral requirement.7
The Court's final guideline concerning the sufficiency of the prosecutor's
explanation provided that the reason had to be "related to the particular case
to be tried. 72
On its facts, the decision in Batson was a limited one, applying only to the
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases and only when
the defendant and the challenged jurors were of the same race. Beginning five
years later, however, the Court lifted these limitations over the course of three
holdings, though notably confining the cases it heard to those involving
challenges based upon the juror's race.73 In the first of these cases, Powers
64. Id. at 97.
65. Id. at 99.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 97.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 98.
72. Id. (footnote omitted).
73. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has been invited on several
occasions to consider Batson outside the context of race. However, prior to granting the petition for
certiorari in J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993), discussed infra at notes 93-121 and
accompanying text, the Court had consistently rejected such invitations by refusing to grant certiorari.
See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988) (dealing with gender-based
peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069 (1990); United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538 (1st
[Vol. 70:569
RELIGION AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
v. Ohio,74 the Court subtly modified the rule it had announced in Batson, a
modification which had the effect of extending Batson 's central holding. In
Powers, the Court found that, under the Equal Protection Clause, the
defendant and the excluded juror need not belong to the same race in order
for the defendant to challenge the prosecutor's exclusion of members of a
particular race through peremptory challenges. 75
The holding in Powers affected the traditional nature and use of the
peremptory challenge in two significant respects. First, the Powers decision
signaled a shift in the Court's focus. 76 While the Batson Court had concen-
trated primarily on the effects of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges on the criminal defendant's rights, the Powers Court was
concerned with such effects on the rights of the excluded juror.71 By
focusing on these rights, however, the Court was forced to confront the
problem of standing. Accordingly, the Court in Powers engaged in a detailed
analysis of that issue,78 finally concluding that a criminal defendant does
have standing to raise the equal protection claims of jurors upon whom
peremptory challenges are exercised in a racially discriminatory manner.79
Second, by acknowledging such standing and allowing defendants to assert
it despite the fact that they are not of the same race as the excluded jurors,
the Court significantly widened the group to which the Batson objection
became available. Thus, as a result of Powers, exercising of a peremptory
challenge required an explanation in more cases and in a greater variety of
situations. In this respect, Powers further limited the use of the peremptory
challenge-a use which had been virtually uninhibited prior to Batson.
In the same year that Powers was decided, the Court lifted yet another of
Batson's limitations, thereby further restraining the unbridled use of
Cir. 1987) (dealing with age as a basis for exercising a peremptory challenge), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1042 (1988); Daniels v. State, 581 So. 2d 536 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (dealing with gender-based
peremptory challenges), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 914 (1991).
74. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
75. Id. at 402.
76. This shift in focus is crucial in analyzing proposed extensions of Batson to attributes other than
race, including a juror's religious affiliation, for it allows the discussion to center around the juror's
rights, as opposed to those of the actual litigants.
77. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-10. The Batson Court had also recognized the rights of the excluded
juror, but the core of its opinion concentrated on the rights of the criminal defendant. Actually, the
groundwork for Batson's and Powers' acknowledgement of the excluded juror's rights had been laid
more than a century before in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). See Prior, supra note 36,
at 583-84. In Strauder, the Court held that a statute permitting only white males to serve on juries
violated the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights of both the defendant and the excluded juror.
100 U.S. at 309-10.
78. The Court's analysis of the standing issue in Powers focused on the exception to the general
rule that "a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim of relief
premised on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (citations omitted).
The Powers Court then examined whether each of the three criteria for recognizing such an exception
was satisfied in the context of a criminal defendant asserting an excluded juror's rights. First, the
defendant himself must have suffered an injury-in-fact before he will be permitted to assert the interests
of the excluded juror. Id at 411. Second, the defendant and excluded juror must have a close
relationship. Id. Finally, some barrier must exist which renders the excluded juror unable to assert his
own interests. Id.
79.Id. at 415.
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peremptory challenges. In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,8° the Court
held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits both parties in a civil suit from
excluding jurors through the exercise of peremptory challenges which are
based on the juror's race." In so holding, the Court was forced to confront
and overcome two potential roadblocks: the issues of state action and
standing.
Because Edmonson was a civil action involving private litigants, it presented
a hurdle for the Court since the Equal Protection Clause is triggered only by
state action. Edmonson involved the claim that a private party's exercise of
peremptory challenges should be subject to Batson 's limitations. Thus, to find
the requisite state action to bring the Equal Protection Clause into play, the
Court again engaged in an intricate analysis of the issue using existing case
law-an analysis similar to that which it had conducted in Powers on the
issue of standing.82 After completing this analysis, the Court concluded that
private parties indeed qualify as state actors when exercising peremptory
challenges and are thus subject to the dictates of the Equal Protection
Clause.83 Revisiting its analysis and holding in Powers, the Court also
reasoned that a party in a civil case has standing to assert the equal protection
rights of an excluded juror.8 4 The Court rejected the argument that a Powers
standing analysis should differ in the Edmonson context simply because the
former was a criminal case, while the latter involved civil litigation.85
Although the Edmonson Court took Batson only one step further, the effect
of the decision on the peremptory challenge was great. Following Edmonson,
parties in civil cases were required to articulate reasons for exercising their
peremptory challenges upon a prima facie showing of purposeful racial
discrimination by their opponents.
The final extension of Batson which had an impact on the scope and use of
the peremptory challenge occurred in Georgia v. McCollum.86 In McCollum,
the Court found that the constitutional limitation imposed by Batson on a
prosecutor's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges was equally
applicable to criminal defendants.8 7 The Court mandated such an extension
after addressing four basic issues. The Court first found that the harms
undergirding the holding in Batson are no less present when a defendant
80. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
81. Id. at 616.
82. In finding that a private party achieves state actor status and is thus subject to the Equal
Protection Clause when he uses his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the
Edmonson Court utilized the analytical framework set forth in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982). In Lugar, the Court had held that a finding of state action required satisfaction of two
requirements. First, the exercise of a right or privilege that leads to the claimed constitutional deprivation
must have its source in state authority. Id. at 939-41. Second, it must be possible for the private party
charged with state action to be fairly described as a state actor. Id. at 941-42.
83. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 619-28.
84. Id. at 628-31.
85. Id. at 630.
86. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
87. Id. at 2359.
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exercises peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory way.8 The
Court also found that exercises of peremptory challenges by criminal
defendants constitute state action; the Court rendered this holding after
conducting the same analysis it had undertaken in Edmonson.89 Next, the
Court inquired into the prosecutor's standing to raise the excluded juror's
claim of unconstitutional discrimination and, referring primarily to its decision
in Powers, found that such standing did in fact exist.90 Finally, the Court
found that imposition of its decision did not impede the rights of the criminal
defendant, including the Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of
counsel and to an impartial jury.9' Batson thus came full circle in McCollum;
after McCollum, all parties in both criminal and civil cases were subject to
Batson's prohibition on race-based peremptory challenges.
This series of cases changed the face of the peremptory challenge and
altered its nature by requiring that a reason be given in situations where none
was previously required.92 Batson may therefore be described as an encroach-
ment on the peremptory challenge and each of the latter three opinions as
extensions of that encroachment. These cases demonstrate, however, that the
Court peculiarly confined its examination to racially discriminatory use of the
peremptory challenge. Once the McCollum Court precluded all parties in
criminal and civil cases from basing their peremptory challenges on race,
courts and commentators began to question the proper extent of Batson and
how that decision was meant to and should shape the nature and use of
peremptory challenges in the future. The following question captures the
nature of the debate which developed following Batson and its progeny: What
are the constitutionally permissible attributes of a juror upon which a
peremptory challenge may be based?
2. Navigating New Territory: J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.
and the Issue of Gender
Two years after deciding McCollum, the Court finally addressed this
question and provided a somewhat limited answer. The Court's grant of
certiorari in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. represented the first occasion in
which the Court accepted the invitation to examine the applicability of Batson
in a context other than race.93 Specifically, the parties in J.E.B. asked the
88. Id. at 2353-54.
89. Id. at 2354-57. For an explanation of the analytical framework used by the Court on the issue
of state action, see supra note 82.
90. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357. For an explanation of the analytical framework used by the
Court on the issue of standing, see supra note 78.
91. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357-59.
92. As one author notes, three kinds of challenges existed following Batson and its progeny: the
challenge for cause, the peremptory challenge, and the modified peremptory challenge for which a
reason is required. Babcock, supra note 48, at 482.
93. As previously noted, numerous parties had invited the Court to consider the applicability of
Batson to juror attributes other than race prior to J.E.B., but the Court declined these invitations by
denying their petitions for certiorari. See supra note 73.
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Court to confront the issue of whether, in light of the reasoning and holding
of Batson, the Equal Protection Clause precludes gender-based peremptory
challenges in addition to those based on race. By a 6-3 vote,94 the Supreme
Court added gender to the list of juror attributes upon which parties may not
constitutionally rely when exercising peremptory challenges.
J.E.B. began as an action involving paternity and child support.95 When the
case came to trial, the venire was composed of twenty-four women and twelve
men.9 6 Following successful challenges for cause, three of the jurors were
excused, leaving only ten males among the thirty-three remaining prospective
jurors.97 The State then utilized nine of its ten peremptory challenges to
remove men from the jury.9 8 The respondent used all but one of his strikes
to eliminate women from the jury.9 Thus, the jury that heard the case
consisted exclusively of female members. °0
After the parties exercised their strikes, the respondent raised a Batson
challenge to the State's strikes, arguing that Batson was applicable not only
to racially-based strikes but to those based upon gender as well; the
respondent's attorney argued that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits such peremptory challenges. 0'° The trial
court rejected this argument, the case proceeded to trial, and the jury entered
a verdict in favor of the State, finding that the respondent was the child's
father and ordering him to pay child support.0 2 The respondent appealed the
trial court's rejection of his equal protection challenge to the gender-based
strikes by the State. 0 3 Based upon the Alabama Supreme Court's refusal in
previous cases to extend the holding of Batson to strikes based upon gender,
however, the state court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
and the state's supreme court subsequently denied J.E.B.'s petition for
certiorari.'0 4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,' and
on November 2, 1993, heard oral arguments from the parties.
0 6
The Court's decision in J.E.B. is monumental in terms of what it adds to
existing constitutional and jury selection jurisprudence. The Court finally
addressed the question of whether Batson 's equal protection guarantee extends
beyond the confines of race. The Court answered this question affirmatively
and held that the Batson equal protection analysis applies to peremptory
94. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion authored by Justice Blackmun. Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id.
95. Id. at 1421.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1421-22.
98. Id. at 1422.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. J.E.B. v. State ex rel. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330 (1993).
106. Arguments Before the Court: Courts and Procedure, 62 U.S.L.W. 3329 (Nov. 9, 1993).
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strikes based upon gender. 1 ' Having found that the Equal Protection Clause
does govern peremptory challenges based upon gender, the Court conducted
the equal protection analysis applicable to gender-based classifications.' 8
The specific question addressed by the Court was "whether peremptory
challenges based on gender stereotypes provide substantial aid to a litigant's
effort to secure a fair and impartial jury."10 9
Before conducting its equal protection analysis, the Court chronicled
America's history of excluding women from jury service.11 While the Court
acknowledged that this history of gender discrimination differs from that
experienced by racial minorities in America, the Court highlighted the ways
in which the histories of gender and race discrimination are similar."' In
rejecting the argument that the differing experiences of women and racial
minorities warrant confinement of the application of equal protection
principles to peremptory challenges based upon race," the Court noted that,
"with respect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a history
of total exclusion.'
' 13
The Court then went on to conduct an equal protection analysis of gender-
based peremptory challenges. In conducting this analysis, the Court rejected
the State's assertion that gender is an accurate predictor of a juror's
attitudes." 4 Instead of assisting in the task of selecting an impartial jury, the
Court found that reliance on gender stereotypes merely serves to "ratify and
reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and women."''
Borrowing from its earlier opinions dealing with racial discrimination in jury
selection, the Court observed that discrimination based on gender, like race,
harms litigants, the community, and the excluded juror. 16 In the end, the
107. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994).
108. Id. at 1425. Under the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence, a gender-based
classification does not pass constitutional muster unless it is substantially related to the achievement of
an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
109. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426.
110. See id. at 1422-24.
111. "'Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names,
and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve
as legal guardians of their own children."' Id. at 1425 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
685 (1973)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1427. Although Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court's opinion, she disagreed with
the Court's assertion that gender is never an accurate predictor of how a juror will view a case:
[T]hough there have been no similarly definitive studies regarding, for example, sexual
harassment, child custody, or spousal or child abuse, one need not be a sexist to share the
intuition that in certain cases a person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant
to his or her view of the case.
Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor agreed that for constitutional purposes, gender is
irrelevant; however, she added that "to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not
to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact." Id. Unlike the other members of the
majority, O'Connor acknowledged that "gender-based assumptions about juror attitudes" are "sometimes
accurate." Id.
115. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
116. Id.
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Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the exercise of
peremptory challenges based upon gender."'
The J.E.B. Court articulated a procedure for handling claims of gender-
based peremptory challenges much like that which was set forth in Batson.
The party alleging discrimination must make a prima facie case that his
opponent exercised a peremptory challenge in an intentionally discriminatory
way."' The party who exercised the challenge must then explain the basis
for his challenge." 9
3. Religion: The Next Potential Argument for Alteration
The decision handed down by the Court in J.E.B. extended Batson's
applicability by adding gender to the list of attributes upon which a party's
peremptory challenge decision may not be based. Because the express
language of J.E.B. was not broadly-based, however, one cannot clearly
determine which other attributes might be added to that list. Instead of
conclusively addressing the exact scope and extent of Batson, the Court's
language confines the holding in J.E.B. to the context of gender. Rather than
using more sweeping language to either explicitly or implicitly .resolve the
question of exactly which juror attributes are constitutionally impermissible
bases for exercising peremptory challenges, the Court pointedly focused on
the constitutionality of gender-based challenges. 2 Because the Court opted
to decide only the specific issue presented-whether equal protection
principles prohibit gender-based peremptory challenges-lower courts must
now grapple with equal protection claims by other cognizable groups and the
propriety of further extensions of Batson.12 ' Among the first of these will
undoubtedly be claims that a juror's affiliation with a particular religion or his
religiosity is a constitutionally impermissible basis upon which to exercise a
peremptory challenge.
Even prior to the Court's decision in J.E.B., there were several indications
that, regardless of the way in which the Court ultimately ruled, religious
affiliation would be one of the next attributes the Court would be asked to
117. Id. at 1430.
118. Id. at 1429.
119. Id. at 1429-30.
120. The Court demonstrated this focus in the various phrasings of its holding: "We hold that gender,
like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality," id. at 1421; "[i]ntentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause," id. at 1422;
and "the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender," id.
at 1430.
121. The majority in J.E.B. did, however, endeavor to cut off some of these claims by announcing
that its decision would not signal the death of peremptory challenges but would leave open the
possibility of basing strikes on certain attributes. According to the Court, "Parties still may remove
jurors whom they feel might be less acceptable than others on the panel ... [and may also] remove
from the venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to 'rational basis' review." Id. at 1429
(citations omitted).
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address. In fact, parties had already begun to present the issue to lower
courts, 2 and there was far from universal agreement on the constitutional
propriety of religion-based peremptory challenges. Most of the courts and
commentators finding that Batson prohibited religion-based peremptory
challenges gave this specific issue only cursory attention.123 Few actually
conducted any detailed and meaningful analysis of the specific issue of
religion. 24 In the year before the Court handed down its decision in J.E.B.,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court directly confronted the issue and, after
a careful and detailed analysis, rejected the notion that an extension of Batson
to peremptory challenges based upon religious affiliation was warranted or
required.'2 5 That the Minnesota Supreme Court decided this case before
122. For example, in the highly-publicized rape trial of William Kennedy Smith, the defense attorney
argued that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude three Jewish jurors was
impermissibly based upon religion, an argument rejected by the trial judge. Wade Lambert & Stephen
J. Adler, Law: Jewish Jurors' Exclusion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1991, at B6.
Some lower courts indirectly addressed the issue of the permissibility of basing peremptory challenges
on religion when evaluating the sufficiency of a party's proffered race-neutral reason in response to a
Batson challenge. These courts found Batson satisfied by race-neutral explanations which were based
upon religious affiliation, implicitly suggesting that such a basis for a peremptory challenge is, in fact,
permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the
trial court properly rejected the defendant's Batson challenge when the prosecutor explained that
uncertainty about a juror's religious beliefs was the reason for the peremptory challenge), cert. denied,
496 U.S. 927 (1990); State v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 589 (IlL App. Ct.) (upholding the trial court's
assessment that fear of religious influence and ajuror's statement that she did not want to serve satisfied
the race-neutral requirement of Batson), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. 1991).
Finally, one court not only recognized that peremptory challenges are sometimes based on religion,
but also suggested that such a basis is appropriate and necessary. See State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51,
64 (Mo. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); see also State v. Hlavaty, 871 S.W.2d
600, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that "[tihe exercise of peremptory challenges requires a subjective
evaluation by counsel based upon a multitude of legitimate considerations, such as... religion").
Some state courts have used provisions of their state constitutions to strike down religion-based
peremptory challenges. See, e.g., People v. Fudge, 875 P.2d 36, 47 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (holding that
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude a group of citizens distinguished on religious grounds is
precluded by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution); State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1158
(N.J. 1986) (holding that various provisions of the state constitution, when read together, entitle criminal
defendants to an impartial jury chosen without discrimination on the basis of religious principles).
123. See, e.g., Eiland v. State, 607 A.2d 42, 58 (Md. CL Spec. App.) ("It is hard to imagine that [the
Equal Protection Clause] should not be aimed at peremptories based upon ajuror's religion."), rev'd sub
nom. Tyler v. State, 623 A.2d 648 (Md. 1993); Dave Harbeck, Comment, Eliminating Unconstitutional
Juries: Applying United States v. De Gross to All Heightened Scrutiny Equal Protection Groups in the
Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 77 MINN. L. REv. 689, 691, 694 (1993) (asserting that "future
decisions should extend the protection which De Gross provides for gender-based peremptories to any
group which warrants intermediate or strict scrutiny under traditional equal protection principles," and
later citing religion as such a group) (footnotes omitted).
124. For example, the specific issue of the constitutional permissibility of using religious affiliation
as the basis for a peremptory challenge was not presented to the Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v.
Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990). The court nevertheless resolved that issue in its holding. Although
Levinson actually involved a Batson challenge to gender-based strikes, the court's holding also
encompassed race, religion, and ancestry as bases which are "off limits" in exercising peremptory
challenges absent a nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. at 850.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently handed down an opinion that gave more than lip
service to the issue. That court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits peremptory challenges that are based on religion. See Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL
695868, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994). No majority opinion was written, although there were
several strong dissents in the case.
125. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. CL 2120 (1994).
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J.E.B. does not lessen the persuasiveness of its argument. The rationale used
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Davis offers useful insight into
the debate left unresolved by J.E.B. regarding the constitutionality of religion-
based peremptory challenges. What makes Davis more persuasive than
assertions to the contrary is the fact that the opinion provides detailed and
well-reasoned explanations for its holding.
26
The Minnesota Supreme Court refused to extend Batson in State v. Davis
and held that religion-neutral explanations for peremptory strikes allegedly
exercised on the basis of religion are not required. 27 In Davis, the criminal
defendant's challenge arose when, in response to his request for a race-neutral
reason for peremptorily challenging an African-American juror, the prose-
cutor's explanation focused on the juror's religious affiliation. 2 Clearly
relying upon a generalization regarding the belief system of those who belong
to the particular faith, the prosecutor explained, "'The Jahovah [sic] Witness
faith is of a mind the higher powers will take care of all things necessary. In
my experience Jahovah [sic] Witness are reluctant to exercise authority over
their fellow human beings in this Court House."" 29 The trial judge accepted
this religion-based explanation as a race-neutral reason, held that it satisfied
Batson, and thus allowed the prosecutor's peremptory challenge. 3 ° While
the defendant raised no objection to the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral
reason at trial, on appeal he asserted that the explanation was "constitutionally
impermissible as religious discriminhtion," thus inviting the Minnesota
Supreme Court to extend Batson to the context of religion.' 31 However, the
court's analysis of Batson's reasoning and context led it to reject the
defendant's assertion and to affirm his conviction.
32
On November 1, 1993, one day before the United States Supreme Court
heard oral argument in J.E.B., the defendant in Davis filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari with the Court; however, his petition was denied after the
Supreme Court rendered its decision in J.E.B.133 Just as J.E.B. did not
conclusively resolve the issue, the Court's denial of certiorari in Davis leaves
the constitutional status of religion-based peremptory challenges subject to
126. One component of the court's decision in Davis was subsequently contradicted and thus
implicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. See infra note 160 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, other factors which were integral to the holding in Davis survived J.E.B. and support
the proposition that a line can and should be drawn between peremptory challenges based upon race and
gender and peremptory challenges based upon religion. See infra part IH.B.
127. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771.
128. Id. at 768.
129. Id. (quoting from the record).
130. Id. at 768, 772 n.4.
131. Id. at 768.
132. Id. at 771.
133. Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote
a dissent explaining why he felt that certiorari should have been granted. See id. at 2120-22 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Though she concurred with the Court's denial of certiorari, Justice Ginsburg wrote
separately to "note that the dissent's portrayal of the opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court is
incomplete." Id. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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debate. 34 The denial of a petition for certiorari does not constitute a
decision on the merits. 3 5 Thus, no conclusions may be drawn regarding the
Court's stance on the constitutional status of religion-based peremptory
challenges from its denial of certiorari in Davis.
The constitutional permissibility of religion-based peremptory challenges
and the propriety of extending Batson to that context was clearly on the minds
of the Supreme Court Justices when they heard oral argument in J.E.B.
Indeed, the following observation by one commentator supports this point:
"[T]he justices appeared most concerned with.., whether the court would be
committing itself to eliminating strikes based on other grounds such as
religion .. .. "36 Another account of the oral argument in J.E.B. reported
that "[o]ne concern evident in the courtroom today was whether the addition
of sex as a prohibited factor in jury selection would inevitably mean that
religion, national origin, age and perhaps other factors would also be added
to the prohibited list."'37 However, as the following argument demonstrates,
courts faced with this issue in the future need not add religion to that list,
despite the Supreme Court's decision in J.E.B. to add gender.
III. IN DEFENSE OF THE RELIGION-BASED
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Several points raised in Davis demonstrate that an extension of Batson,
J.E.B., and the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition on the free, uninhibited
exercise of peremptory challenges to challenges based upon religious
affiliation is not constitutionally warranted.3 Such an extension does not
necessarily follow from the opinions of Batson and J.E.B.; the language used
in those opinions does not necessarily dictate that religion-based peremptory
challenges are or should be constitutionally prohibited, and those decisions
themselves even suggest potential points of departure. Furthermore, the
practical implications and difficulties of implementing such a rule counsel
against an extension of Batson and J.E.B. to religion.
134. Compare Marcia Coyle, High Court Passes on Bid to Extend Peremptory Ban, NAT'L L.J., June
6, 1994, at A12 (noting that, in declining to review Davis, the Court "drew the line-at least for
now-against extending its non-discrimination rule to religion") with Tuite, supra note 11, at 6 ("Since
denials of certiorari are not affirmances, one cannot assume that religion-based challenges will survive
135. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSITUTIONAL LAW 61 (12th ed. 1991); see also Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 388 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) ("(A] denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding
the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review.").
136. Joan Biskupic, Justices Consider Banning Sex-Based Exclusion ofJurors: Men and Women Can
Be Equally Unbiased, Court Is Told, WASH. PosT, Nov. 3, 1993, at A3.
137. Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Jury-Selection by Sex, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1993, at A22.
138. See infra parts HLI.B-C.
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A. The Lay of the Land
The Court has undeniably laid the procedural foundation for attacking
religion-based peremptory challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. Such
challenges are made possible by virtue of the Court's focus in Powers on the
rights of the excluded juror,139 as well as its holdings in Powers and
Edmonson that the doctrine of standing does not preclude a party from
asserting such rights. 40 Furthermore, Edmonson and McCollum demonstrate
that the exercise of a peremptory challenge constitutes state action and thereby
implicates the Equal Protection Clause regardless of which party exercises the
peremptory challenge. 4' Finally, while J.E.B. itself involved a state paternity
action and scrutinized the State's use of its peremptory strikes, Edmonson and
McCollum suggest that the ruling in J.E.B. applies not just to the government,
but also to private parties, in both civil and criminal contexts. 142 What
remains questionable, however, is whether the Equal Protection Clause
substantively prohibits religion-based peremptory strikes.
Clearly, religion cannot be used to systematically exclude groups from jury
service. Federal law precludes the exclusion of persons of a particular
religious faith from a venire on the basis of that faith. 43 However, the
legislative history indicates that "the bill leaves undisturbed the right of a
litigant to exercise his peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors for purely
subjective reasons."'" Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the
systematic exclusion of women from jury venires violates the Sixth Amend-
ment's requirement that the jury venire be chosen from a fair cross-section of
the community.' 4' The Court has also ruled, however, that discriminatory
exercises of peremptory challenges do not implicate nor violate the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross-section requirement. 46 As one court has noted,
there is an important distinction between excluding a cognizable group from
a venire pool and peremptorily striking group members; while the former
"bespeaks a priori across-the-board total unfitness," the latter "merely
suggests potential partiality in a particular isolated case." 47
139. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 78-79, 84-85 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 82-83, 89 and accompanying text.
142. See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court, 6-3, Prohibits Sex Bias in Jury Selection, WASH. POST, Apr.
20, 1994, at Al. In her concurrence, however, Justice O'Connor reiterated her position that Edmonson
and McCollum had mistakenly categorized the exercise of peremptory challenges by private civil
litigants and criminal defendants as "state action." J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1432
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, while Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority opinion,
she agreed with its holding only to the extent that the Court recognized that the Equal Protection Clause
limits the government from discriminating on the basis of gender in jury selection. Id. Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, agreed with O'Connor's position. Id. at 1437 n.2
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Jury Selection and Service Act § 1862, 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
144. H.R. RnP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1968).
145. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
146. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 (1989).
147. United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 554 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (italics in original),
vacated, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
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Before analyzing the propriety of extending the prohibitions of Batson and
J.E.B. to religion-based peremptory challenges, it is important to note that the
practice in question is not one which rarely occurs; a constitutional attack on
religion-based peremptory challenges would have neither an imaginary nor a
purely theoretical target. Indeed, when trial lawyers proceed with voir dire,
they seem to be commonly concerned with the religious affiliations of
potential jurors and the sAtrength of their religious beliefs. Attorneys use
information regarding jurors' affiliations and beliefs,148 coupled with certain
preconceived notions and stereotypes about such affiliations and beliefs, to
form the basis of their challenges for cause and beremptory challenges.
Literature for the practitioner evidences the reliance attorneys place on
information and assumptions about a juror's religion and religious beliefs.
These preconceived notions and stereotypes exist in two basic forms. Some
are related to particular religious faiths. For instance, one text cautions as
follows: "On the matter of religion, attorneys who are defending are advised
that Presbyterians are too cold; Baptists are even less desirable; and
Lutherans, especially Scandinavians, will convict. Methodists may be
acceptable. Keep Jews, Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, and
agnostics." 49 Another practice manual notes that religion can be "critical"
in divorce and child custody cases, for prospective jurors who identify with
religions that oppose divorce "tend to be closed-minded and judgmental." o
The reasoning offered by the State in Davis regarding Jehovah's Witnesses
provides a concrete, real-life example of this type of religious stereo-
typing.1
5 1
Trial lawyers also base peremptory challenges on their perception of the
strength of a particular belief system or faith. For example, one text advises
that attorneys in criminal cases should probe the strength of a prospective
juror's religious beliefs in order to "gauge the rigidity of that juror's concepts
of right and wrong"; an active churchgoer is labeled a dogmatic moralist and
thus likely to identify with the prosecution. 52 This advice comports with the
philosophy espoused by noted criminal defense attorney Clarence Darrow:
"'In general, I don't want a religious person, for he believes in sin and
punishment. ' ' ' 153 Yet another text warns: "Religious fanatics are almost
always self-righteous and narrow. Fundamentalists are conservatively oriented.
Devout church members tend to be conformists. However, some are very
148. Questionnaire answers and investigative results provide attorneys with information about
prospective jurors' religious affiliations. Some of the questionnaires that prospective jurors are required
to complete ask them to indicate their religious preferences. See 2 GINGER, supra note 7, § 12.23. Other
questionnaires only implicitly invite them to provide this information by asking them to list those social
and civic organizations to which they belong. See id. § 12.24; WERCHICK, supra note 13, § 9.4.
Attorneys may also learn about prospective jurors' religious beliefs by submitting the venire list to
someone who is familiar with the community. Id. § 5.8.
149. REID HASTIE Er AL., INSIDE THE JURY 123 (1983) (citation omitted).
150. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 22, at 393.
151. See supra text accompanying note 129.
152. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 22, § 11.08.
153. KASSiN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 25, at 53 (quoting EDWrN H. SUTHERLAND & DONALD R.
CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 442 (7th ed. 1966)).
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compassionate. Jurors with a strong Catholic faith may favor Catholic
litigants.'
5 4
Not only do these preconceived notions and stereotypes exist within the
legal community, but attorneys also act upon them. 5 Because such religion-
based challenges do in fact occur, the issue, in light of Batson and J.E.B.,
thus becomes the propriety of acting upon them from a constitutional
standpoint. In reality, "use of peremptories is at best based upon seat-of-the-
pants instincts, which are undoubtedly crudely stereotypical and may in many
cases be hopelessly mistaken." 5 6 But should courts hold that, based upon
Batson and J.E.B., the' Constitution prohibits this practice of acting upon
notions concerning religious affiliation and perceived religious beliefs when
exercising peremptory challenges? Some courts addressed and answered this
question before the Court decided J.E.B. ' 7 But now that the Court has
extended Batson to gender, courts can expect to be presented with this
question more frequently.
B. Constitutional Considerations: Drawing the Line
Prior to J.E.B., the case against extending Batson to the context of religion
could have begun-and ended-with the argument that the Equal Protection
Clause does not apply to peremptory challenges.'5 8 Indeed, before J.E.B.,
discussion regarding the proper constitutional scope of the peremptory
challenge often revolved around the debate concerning the breadth of the
154. ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JuRY 79 (2d ed. 1988).
155. This Note in no way intends to suggest that the religious stereotypes on which some attorneys
rely always or even frequently have any basis in fact or are, as a practical matter, appropriate grounds
upon which an attorney should base his peremptory challenges. Indeed, in this regard, this Author
believes that one commentator provides the most useful advice to the practitioner by noting that religion
is a fallible predictor "If we do our jobs as advocates, ... we force ourselves to recognize that
individual members of any group may not perform according to such outdated stereotypes." WERCHICK,
supra note 13, §§ 8.8, 21.8. The points noted in the text are offered merely to demonstrate that there
is (in reality) a practice which is potentially subject to constitutional attack.
156. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
158. This argument formed the basis of the Texas Court of Appeals' refusal to extend Batson to
religion. Casarez v. State, 857 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. CL App. 1993) (en banc), revd, 1994 WL 695868,
at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 123 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
C[U]nadulterated equal protection analysis is simply inapplicable to peremptory challenges exercised
in any particular case."). In Casarez, the prosecutor cited religious affiliation as a race-neutral
explanation for peremptorily challenging two African-American venirepersons. 857 S.W.2d at 782. The
court upheld this explanation against the defendant's constitutional attack on the theory that "[t]raditional
equal protection analysis is not appropriate when applied to peremptory challenges. The Batson decision
itself did not apply traditional equal protection analysis ... ." Id. at 783. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals subsequently reversed the appellate court's judgment and held that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to peremptory challenges and prohibits religion-based peremptory
challenges. Casarez, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994).
Before the J.E.B. decision, this argument was refuted by pointing to th6 Court's extensive reference
to the Equal Protection Clause throughout the Batson opinion. It is interesting to note, however, that
neither the Court's grant of certiorari nor counsel for the defendant in Batson mentioned equal protection
as an issue. Babcock, supra note 48, at 467.
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holding and reasoning in Batson. 59 In J.E.B., however, the Court deprived
this argument of all vitality when it explicitly relied on the Equal Protection
Clause to determine the constitutionality of gender-based peremptory
challenges. The Court clearly established that the Equal Protection Clause
provides the proper framework for evaluating claims that peremptory
challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner.
60
Labeling the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
proper analytical tool for assessing the constitutionality of religion-based
peremptory challenges, however, raises a very intriguing issue. As one author
notes, "Religion-based discrimination is rarely challenged under the equal
protection clause."' 6' The two religion clauses of the First Amendment to
the Constitution 62  have traditionally governed constitutional issues of
religion and religious discrimination. Application of the Equal Protection
Clause to religion-based peremptory challenges would thus be an unusual step,
one which implicates certain considerations that the Court has never before
expressly addressed since the First Amendment, not the Fourteenth, has
traditionally provided the framework for analyzing issues involving religion.
Equal protection analysis would first require a finding that either religion
in general or specific religious denominations in particular constitute
cognizable classes.'63 Furthermore, of the different "tiers" of review
employed by the Supreme Court in analyzing purported equal protection
violations,'" it is not clear which the Court would apply to religion, though
159. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the Batson opinion itself uses none of the common
equal protection terminology that one might expect to find in a traditional equal protection case. The
Texas Court of Appeals made this observation. See Casarez, 857 S.W.2d at 783 n.2. Indeed, Batson and
its progeny include no discussion of governmental objectives or the "fit" between the means chosen and
the ends sought to be accomplished. See infra note 164.
160. J.E.B. thus defeats one of the arguments on which the Supreme Court of Minnesota relied in
holding that religion-based peremptory challenges do not run afoul of the Constitution. Justice Thomas
noted this point in his dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in Davis. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114
S. Ct. 2120, 2121-22 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[J.E.B.] shatters the Supreme Court of
Minnesota's understanding that Batson's equal protection analysis applies solely to racially based
peremptory strikes."), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). As Justice Ginsburg pointed out
in her concurrence with the Court's decision to deny certiorari, however, Justice Thomas' characteriza-
tion is "incomplete." Id. at 2120 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Davis court relied on other factors to
reach its holding, factors that are relevant in assessing the constitutional permissibility of religion-based
peremptory challenges. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 188, 203, and notes 205-06 and
accompanying text.
161. JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT DIscRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LmGATION
§ 5.15 (1988).
162. The First Amendment states in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend I. In its line of
First Amendment decisions involving religion, the United States Supreme Court has treated the two
religion clauses contained in the First Amendment separately; thus, while both the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause serve to protect one's religious beliefs and practices, each employs an
analysis quite distinct from the other. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 1501-89 (separating
the discussion of the Constitution and religion into two sections to correspond with the two clauses).
163. One court has questioned whether the Equal Protection Clause, in fact, even provides any degree
of protection to religion. See People v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047, 1054 n.3 (Cal. 1989) (en banc)
('Ulnder Batson it is at least questionable whether... a religious group can constitute a 'cognizable
group."'), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990).
164. The Court treats racial and ethnic classifications as suspect for purposes of equal protection
analysis. GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 638. Hence, the Court will invalidate such classifications if they
are not narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct.
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strict scrutiny appears to be the appropriate framework. While the Supreme
Court has never explicitly held that religion constitutes a suspect class so as
to warrant strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, some Justices and
commentators have simply assumed that it does. 6 1 One might plausibly
reason by analogy to argue that strict scrutiny should, in fact, apply. Although
Larson v. Valente 66 involved a challenge under the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment, the Court deviated in that case from its usual
Establishment Clause analysis and instead applied strict scrutiny to a law
which, in effect, preferred certain religious denominations over others.' 67
The Court chose strict scrutiny as its primary mode of analysis after declaring
that religious denominational preferences in the law are suspect. 68  -
2816, 2826 (1993). Strict scrutiny also applies when governmental action infringes upon a fundamental
right or interest. GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 819. When religion-based peremptory challenges are
permitted, the excluded juror is merely precluded from serving on that particular jury. Such preclusion
does not constitute denial of any constitutionally recognized right. Jury duty generally has been deemed
a privilege of citizenship. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946). However, this
privilege has not been recognized as fundamental so as to warrant strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause. See GUNTHER, supra note 135, at 820 (noting that the fundamental interest
designation is "limited to a very few areas," including equal access to voting and to the judicial process).
The Court treats gender-based classifications as quasi-suspect and therefore requires that they satisfy
an intermediate form of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 636. Thus, to be valid, gender
classifications must be substantially related to an important governmental objective. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
165. See, e.g., Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120,2121 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that classifications which warrant heightened scrutiny "presumably would include classifications based
on religion'), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993); J.E.B. v. Alabama er rel. T.B., 114 S.
Ct. 1419, 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that classifications warranting heightened scrutiny
"presumably would include religious belief"); Erwin Chemerinsky, The End of Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, TRIAL, Aug. 1994, at 69, 72 (stating that the Court has approved heightened
scrutiny for religion).
A comparison of the plurality and dissenting opinions in Casarez suggests that it is not exactly clear
what level of equal protection scrutiny is applicable to religion. The plurality concluded that religion-
based peremptory challenges are subject to strict scrutiny. Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL
695868, at *8 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (plurality opinion). The plurality reached this conclusion
in an interesting manner. It first discussed the Supreme Court's most recent First Amendment case. Id.
The plurality then concluded that freedom of religion is a fundamental right and that strict scrutiny is
therefore the appropriate level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The plurality therefore
does not appear to hold that religion is a suspect classification, but instead resorts to a "fundamental
rights" argument. See supra note 164. By contrast, one of the dissenting judges asserted that "it has
never been held that any religious group is a 'suspect class deserving special judicial protection' for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes" and would hold that "religious-based peremptory strikes are not
subject to strict scrutiny review." Casarez, 1994 WL at *12 (McCormick, J., dissenting).
166. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
167. Id. at 246. The statute at issue in Larson required religious organizations that received 50% or
more of their solicitations from nonmembers to make certain disclosures. Id. at 231-32. The Court found
that this law had the effect of granting denominational preferences. Id. at 246.
168. Id. at 246 ("[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our
precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality."). After conducting this analysis, the Court found that the government's interest was
compelling but that the means chosen by the state to achieve that interest were not narrowly tailored.
Id. at 248, 251.
In anticipating how the Court might treat arguments that Batson and J.E.B. should be extended to
religion, Larson is the case cited by current Supreme Court Justices for the proposition that religion
likely commands heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2121
(Thomas, J., dissenting); JE.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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While the issue of which amendment would provide the framework for
analyzing religion-based peremptory challenges may be intriguing, it appears
to be mainly academic. This is because the analysis applicable under the Free
Exercise Clause 169 virtually mirrors the Equal Protection Clause's strict
scrutiny inquiry. According to the Supreme Court, the Free Exercise Clause
mandates that a law which burdens religious practices and which is not neutral
or of general applicability "must be justified by a compelling governmental
interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.' ' 70 Thus,
whether scrutinized under the First or the Fourteenth Amendment, peremptory
challenges based upon religion are likely subject to the same analysis.17
The fact that the analysis which would be applicable to religion-based
peremptory challenges is therefore identical to that which applies to race does
not -mandate that the results should likewise be identical.' 72 In the context
of religion, the balance does not tip in favor of the excluded juror's rights, as
it does in the context of race and gender. One could argue that the interest in
preserving the peremptory challenge in its present form, requiring no
explanation for its exercise (except when based upon race or gender), is
compelling and substantial; the peremptory challenge has ancient roots and
has been lauded throughout history as an essential mechanism in the jury
selection process which fosters the constitutional right to an impartial
jury.173 Furthermore, several arguments can be raised to demonstrate that
permitting religion-based peremptory challenges is a narrowly tailored
mechanism for achieving this compelling interest.
While race- and gender-based peremptory challenges fail to satisfy equal
protection scrutiny, religion differs in several respects which are significant
enough to warrant a different outcome. The line can and should be drawn at
religion, notwithstanding that the J.E.B. Court chose not to draw it at gender
and instead extended Batson.'74 Placing the line between race and gender,
on the one hand, and religion, on the other, would be neither implausible nor
169. Of the two religion clauses contained in the First Amendment, peremptory challenges based on
religion most likely implicate the Free Exercise Clause. See Recent Cases, 107 HAxv. L. REV. 1164,
1166-67 (1994). Permitting challenges based upon religion does not "establish" religion or grant
preferences to certain religious denominations but arguably affects one's free exercise of his religion.
170. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993).
171. The Free Exercise Clause inquiry set forth in Hialeah mirrors the strict scrutiny analysis of the
Equal Protection Clause. Both require a compelling governmental interest and narrow tailoring. Compare
supra text accompanying note 170 with supra note 164.
172. Some commentators disagree with this assertion. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Engendering Juries by
PC, WASH. TniES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A16 ("Mhe rationale of J.E.B. seems destined to end peremptory
strikes based on religion or ethnicity."); Jeffrey Rosen, Oversexed, NEw REPUBLIC, May 16, 1994, at
12 ("All strikes based on constitutionally protected categories-race, sex, ethnicity, religion, national
origin and illegitimacy--are now off-limits."). It is, however, incorrect to conclude that simply because
race- and gender-based peremptory challenges fail to satisfy their respective levels of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, challenges based upon religion must also fail to pass constitutional muster.
Each attribute is entitled to a separate analysis because each obviously raises different concerns.
173. See supra part II.A; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 125 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the history of and interests served by the peremptory challenge cannot be lightly
regarded, even if its use is attacked on equal protection grounds).
174. In his analysis of existing case law prior to J.E.B., one trial court judge summarily predicted
that such a line will, in fact, be drawn. See Hett, supra note 36, at 432-33.
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arbitrary.1 7 5 Counsel for the respondent in J.E.B., who argued for extension
of Batson to gender, acknowledged that the feared slippery slope can be
stopped at gender by noting during oral argument that he did not "'think...
that by extending Batson to gender all the chickens will get out of the
henhouse."1
7 6
Several arguments can be advanced to support the assertion that Batson and
J.E.B. involved unique situations and attributes which warranted Equal
Protection Clause intervention, and that religious affiliation differs enough
from race and gender that constitutional intervention is neither necessary nor
desirable. These arguments suggest that the value of the peremptory challenge,
in its traditional form, outweighs the harm that results from allowing religion-
based peremptory challenges, while the harm occasioned by race- and gender-
based strikes is so costly as to allow equal protection principles to modify the
nature of the peremptory challenge when used in those limited situations,7"
The degree of control people have over their attributes provides one
important way in which religion can be distinguished from race and gender.
People clearly have no control over their race or gender. It is commonly
believed, however, that as a general proposition, religion is a chosen attribute
over which an individual has control.' In arguing for the extension of
Batson to gender in J.E.B., the respondent's attorney espoused this under-
standing of religion and acknowledged this "degree of control" argument as
a plausible dividing line between race and gender on the one hand and
175. Justices Thomas and Scalia apparently disagree with this premise. Dissenting from the Court's
denial of certiorari in Davis, Justice Thomas wrote that "no principled reason immediately appears for
declining to apply Batson to any strike based on a classification that is accorded heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause." Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2121 (1994) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993). Nevertheless, the two Justices voted to grant
the petition for certiorari in Davis in order to remand it to the Minnesota Supreme Court to determine
whether there is, in fact, any principled basis for refusing to extend J.E.B. to religion. Id. at 2122.
Justices Thomas and Scalia apparently neglected to consider, however, that the Minnesota Supreme
Court did offer principled bases for confining the holdings of Batson and J.E.B. to their respective
contexts of race and gender. See supra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
176. Coyle, supra note 57, at 27 (quoting John F. Porter, counsel for J.E.B.).
177. One author proposes a similar analysis, noting that an "implicit balancing test" can be found
in Batson and its progeny. Prior, supra note 36, at 594. The interests balanced in those cases were the
importance of the peremptory challenge in our judicial system and the equal protection rights of
excluded jurors. Id. Prior thus explains these cases by asserting that, "with regard to racial stereotypes,
the equal protection clause trumps the peremptory challenge." Id. at 594-95. He continues by proposing
the following general test:
[W]henever a venireperson is struck through the use of a peremptory challenge and that strike
is based on a discriminatory classification, the strike will be valid only where the Sixth and
Seventh Amendment right of an impartial jury afforded to an accused in the criminal context
and a civil litigant, respectively, outweighs the equal protection rights of the excluded juror.
Id. at 595. If Prior's balancing is applied in the context of religion, a different outcome than that reached
in the contexts of race and gender emerges. The following analysis suggests how this difference in
outcomes can be justified and thus supports the proposition that, while Batson andJE.B. may have been
correctly decided, they should not be extended to the context of religion.
178. Not everyone would agree that one always has complete control over his religious identity or
that religion is always a matter of choice. In this regard, it is interesting to note that children tend to
affiliate with their parents' denomination. See BERNARD SPILKA ET AL., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION
78 (1985).
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religion on the other: "'The difference I see is that race and gender are not
something you choose; we do choose our religion. '179
A second persuasive justification can be offered for drawing the Equal
Protection Clause dividing line to protect religion-based peremptory
challenges from constitutional attack. While an attorney might rely on racial
or gender stereotypes when exercising a peremptory challenge, these
stereotypes generally have no basis in fact. The assumption that all or most
members of one race or one gender think alike and hold the same or similar
views on certain issues is unsupported and unwarranted. As the Supreme
Court noted in Batson, "A person's race simply 'is unrelated to his fitness as
a juror.... Race is simply an unacceptable and inaccurate proxy for
impartiality.
Gender-based stereotypes that form the basis of peremptory challenges are
often overbroad and archaic.'' Gender, like race, is an inaccurate predictor
of a juror's ability to be impartial." 2 As such, the J.E.B. Court found that
gender-based peremptory challenges fail to satisfy equal protection scrutiny;
because gender is an inaccurate predictor of a juror's ability to be impartial,
such challenges, the Court established, do not substantially assist in securing
a fair and impartial jury.'83
On the other hand, it does not seem entirely irrational for an attorney, who
has had little time and opportunity to learn about prospective jurors in any
great detail, to act on the assumption that members of particular religious
faiths share similar thoughts and philosophies linked to the particular belief
system embraced by these faiths. 4 Religion, unlike race and gender, may
179. Coyle, supra note 57, at 27 (quoting John F. Porter, counsel for J.E.B.).
180. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217,
227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
181. See, e.g., WARD WAGNER, JR., ART OF ADVOCACY-JURY SELECTION § 1.0419] (1994)
(recommending that prospective female jurors should not be chosen when either the plaintiff or his wife
is young and attractive); Andrew J. White, Jr., Selecting the Jury, in SuccEssFuL JURY TRIALs: A
SYMPOSIUM 123-24 (John A. Appleman ed., 1952) (questioning whether housewives should be avoided
due to their limited experiences).
182. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1427 (1994). TheJ.E.B. Court further noted
that "[tihe majority of studies suggest that gender plays no identifiable role in jurors' attitudes." Id. at
1426 n.9. Some disagree with this premise, however. See, e.g., id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that there is a correlation between a juror's gender and attitudes but that this correlation is
"irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law"); Barbara Franklin, Gender Myths Still Play a Role in Jury
Selection, NAT'L U., Aug. 22, 1994, at Al, A25 (quoting several practitioners who believe that gender
is an accurate predictor in certain cases); Zick Rubin, Peremptory Challenges: A Real Challenge, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., June 13, 1994, at I I (arguing that "gender does matter" because "[o]ne's sex inevitably
determines aspects of one's experience and, thus, affects one's views of the world').
183. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1426.
184. One commentator's description of religion supports this point: "Religions are... communities
of sense and value, groups of believers struggling to come to a common understanding of the world."
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLmCs TRIVIALIZE
RELIGIOUS DEvOTION 142 (1993).
This point gave rise to sharp disagreement on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. One dissenter
supported the proposition that it is fair to make assumptions based on religion, arguing that it is "not
unjust to attribute beliefs characteristic of the faith to all members of the group" because they all "share
the same faith by definition." Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *21 (Tex. Crim. App.
Dec. 14, 1994) (Meyers, ., dissenting). The plurality not only thought that making this assumption was
improper but also described it as fallacious, noting that all members of a religion do not always agree
with their leaders. Id. at *8 n.15 (plurality opinion).
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in fact be an accurate predictor of the attitudes of prospective jurors. As jury
scholar Albert Alschuler notes, religious affiliations in particular cases "'can
be something of a predictor."""
Religion potentially affects a juror's attitudes and his ability to be impartial
because, as Stephen L. Carter notes, "religion matters to people, and matters
a lot.' 6 Not all religious influence on jury decision-making is necessarily
objectionable; 18 7 a juror's religion may affect his decision-making without
rendering him partial or biased. There are circumstances, however, in which
one might legitimately fear the possibility that religion invites such partiality
and bias. For instance, acceptance of a particular religious faith might
coincide with a judgment about certain behaviors. Particular religious
affiliations may, as a group, disapprove of such behavior or activity. During
the course of trial, the possibility that one of the parties engaged in this
behavior or activity may be addressed or revealed. A juror belonging to that
particular religious denomination might, as a result, be biased against the
party on that basis, even if that behavior or activity is not directly related to
the issues of the case. Religion thereby indirectly becomes an improper
influence and may impair a juror's ability to be impartial. The court in Davis
noted this:
A juror's religious beliefs are inviolate, but when they are the basis for a
person's moral values and produce societal views on such matters as the
use of intoxicating liquor, cohabitation, necessity of medical treatment,
civil disobedience, and the like, it would not seem that a peremptory strike
based on these societal views should be attributed to a pernicious religious
bias.'88
In addition, a juror's religion may improperly influence him when the
religion's particular tenets espouse a view- concerning the role of law in
185. Coyle, supra note 134, at A12 (quoting Albert Alschuler). Professor Babcock points to empirical
studies which indicate that jurors with certain religious affiliations are predisposed to react to evidence
or the defendant in a certain manner despite their attempts to be fair and impartial. Barbara A. Babcock,
A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 1139, 1145 n.14
(1993).
One of the dissenting opinions in Casarez offers a reasoned explanation for the belief that religion
may, in fact, serve as a predictor. According to Judge Meyers, members of a particular religion, unlike
those with a common race or gender, are "distinguished by their beliefs, attitudes, and convictions." No.
1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *20 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (Meyers, J., dissenting). Thus,
while race and gender say nothing about a prospective juror's beliefs, "[c]ertain religious beliefs tell us
what his sympathies and prejudices are." Id. at *19. By contrast, the plurality summarily dismissed the
conclusion that religion is an accurate predictor of a juror's attitudes. See id. at *9 (plurality opinion).
186. CARTER, supra note 184, at 4. Carter cites some very interesting statistics to support his point.
Referring to a national magazine survey, he reports that four out of five Americans pray regularly, while
nine out of ten report a belief in God. Id. In addition, Carter reports that "strong majorities of citizens
tell pollsters that their religious beliefs are of great importance to them in their daily lives." Id. Other
statistics support Carter's propositions. For example, 92% of respondents in one survey claimed a
religious preference, while 57% stated that their beliefs are very important to them. SPILKA ET AL., supra
note 178, at 96.
187. See Michael Ariens, Evidence of Religion and the Religion of Evidence, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 65,
99-105 (1992). For example, Professor Ariens notes in his article that it should not be considered
improper for a juror to rely on a divine revelation in deciding whether a criminal defendant is guilty.
Id. at 104.
188. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
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society and the authority of people to judge their fellow men and women.
Finally, religion may render a juror unable to act and think impartially if it
causes the juror to discriminate against others who are of different or
antagonistic faiths. 8 9 As one text notes, "[I]t does seem that members of
minority religions that are in public disrepute have one strike against them
when appearing before juries." 190
Comparing the history of racial and gender discrimination with the history
of religious discrimination, both in governmental participation and in the
composition and selection of juries, provides a third justification for
upholding religion-based peremptory challenges against constitutional attack
while adhering to the holdings of Batson and J.E.B.'9 While certain
religious faiths have undeniably been the targets of discriminatory treatment
at various points in history, 92 instances of discrimination based upon race
and gender have pervaded American history, from the early founding period
through the present day.193
An examination of race and gender discrimination at the various stages in
the jury selection process reveals that various mechanisms, including the
peremptory challenge, have been used rampantly and abusively to prevent
racial minorities and women from participating as jurors. Although the right
of African-American men to serve on juries was recognized in 1880, ' that
right has never been fully realized because of the exclusive use of voter
189. See Ariens, supra note 187, at 104.
190. JAMEs P. LEvINE, JURiEs AND POLITICS 142 (1992).
191. Professor Babcock suggests that this point does, in fact, justify prohibition of race- and gender-
based peremptory challenges, while permitting those based upon religious attributes to remain intact.
In response to those opposed to extending Batson to gender on the ground that most other peremptory
challenges are likewise based upon "unpleasant stereotypes," Professor Babcock asserts: "But in the case
of the postman or the Presbyterian, the same ancient stereotypes about their competence and
predispositions have not been used to prevent them from voting, being summoned for juries, pursuing
their chosen professions and vocations or otherwise participating in public life and discourse." Babcock,
supra note 48, at 478; see also Babcock, supra note 185, at 1173.
192. One cannot ignore the ways in which religion formed the basis for depriving many people of
various rights and opportunities to participate early in our nation's history. As the Supreme Court noted
in Everson v. Board of Education, "The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous with the
colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife, and persecutions, generated in large
part by established sects determined to maintain their absolute political and religious supremacy." 330
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1947). For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided equal treatment only
for those belonging to Christian denominations. ARLIN M. ADAMs & CHARLEs J. EMMERICH, A NATION
DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 10 (1990). In early statutory provisions, one can find the
codification of the "religious test oath"; thus, in Georgia, South Carolina, and New Hampshire, only
Protestants were permitted to serve as state legislators. Id. at 14. Religious requirements for voting and
office-holding declined early in the colonial period, however. See ROBERT J. DINKIN, VOTING IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 40, 47 (1982). Still, until 1961, Maryland's constitution required that state
officials declare their belief in the existence of God. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,489 (1961). The
United States Supreme Court eventually held, however, that this provision unconstitutionally interfered
with public officials' freedom of belief. Id at 496.
193. Consider, for example, that "[iut took fifty-two years, roughly fifty national campaigns, and
almost one thousand state campaigns, the whole adult life of many earnest women, to win the vote."
Babcock, supra note 48, at 474.
194. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
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registration lists to compile lists of prospective jurors in many jurisdic-
tions. 9 Similarly, not until 1973 did all fifty states permit women to serve
on juries; even then, nineteen states provided special gender-based exemptions
from jury service. 9 6 It was another two years before the United States
Supreme Court invalidated laws restricting jury service on the basis of gender
by ruling that such laws violated the Sixth Amendment.'97
The Court in J.E.B. not only discussed the history of excluding women from
juries but also seemed to place great emphasis on this history. In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Blackmun devoted an entire section to this issue,
chronicling in detail America's history of excluding women. from jury
participation.98 The Batson opinion similarly indicates that the Court was
concerned with America's history of excluding African Americans from jury
service. 99 That the Court focused on these histories of exclusion strongly
suggests that they influenced the Court's decisions and were an integral
component of the Court's rationale. The Court felt that checks on the
uninhibited use of peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race
and gender were required, because "[d]iscrimination within the judicial system
... is 'a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing
to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all
others,"'20 and "for a woman [such discrimination] reinvokes a history of
exclusion from political participation. 2 0°
The historical exclusion of racial minorities and women from governmental
participation and jury service supports active application of the Equal
Protection Clause, even into the revered peremptory challenge arena, as a
mechanism for ending such categorical exclusion; Batson and J.E.B. can thus
be described as special responses to special needs.20 2 In Davis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court read Batson in this way, asserting that the Batson Court "could
195. See HIOSHI FAKURAI Er AL., RACE AND THE JuRY 45 (1993). This is true because African
Americans have historically tended to have low voter registration rates. Id.
196. JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND I'usTic: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 225 (1991).
Some of these exemptions included pregnancy, having minor children, embarrassment, and simply
"being female." Id.
197. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
198. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1422-24 (1994); see also Biskupic, supra
note 142, at Al (noting that Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in J.E.B. "was laced with concern
about prejudice toward women in America and comparisons between sex and race discrimination").
199. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
200. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)).
201. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1428.
202. Justice Powell, author of the majority opinion in Batson, has since submitted that the decision
did, in fact, have such a purpose: "Our decision in Batson ... was justified by the compelling need to
remove all vestiges of invidious racial discrimination in the selection of jurors ... Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 672 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor has likewise intimated that Batson should be read narrowly due to the issue with
which it dealt: The "special rule [ofBatson] is a product of the unique history of racial discrimination
in this country; it should not be divorced from that context" Brown v. North Carolina, 479 U.S. 940
(O'Connor, J., concurring), denying cert. to 345 S.E.2d 393 (N.C. 1986). In J.E.B., Justice O'Connor
similarly supported a limited reading of the Court's holding and suggested that Batson and J.E.B were
and should remain isolated responses to special needs: "[G]ender is now governed by the special rule
of relevance formerly reserved for race." J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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no longer ignore the racist manipulation of the jury selection process and,
therefore, modified use of the peremptory with respect to race.
20 3
By contrast, history reveals few similar instances in which people of
particular religious denominations have been categorically denied the
opportunity to serve as jurors.2° Moreover, peremptory challenges have not
consistently been used to target particular religious faiths for exclusion. This
fact proved important to the holding in Davis, where the court found that
"religious bigotry in the use of the peremptory challenge is not as prevalent,
or flagrant, or historically ingrained in the jury selection process as is
race." 2 5 Thus, regarding religion-based peremptory challenges, there is no
special need to which the Equal Protection Clause must respond. This is
precisely one of the ways in which the Davis court justified drawing the line
between religion and Batson, noting that extension of Batson to religion-based
peremptory challenges "would not serve to remedy any long-standing injustice
perpetrated by the court system against specific individuals and classes. 20 6
203. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
204. There do appear to be, however, scattered instances of general religious discrimination in the
jury selection process. For example, in considering an article of the State's Declaration of Rights which
made belief in God a prerequisite for jury service, the Maryland Court of Appeals stated:
[N]o person otherwise competent shall be deemed incompetent as a juror on account of his
religious belief, "provided, he believes in the existence of God, and that under His dispensation
such power will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or punished therefor
either in this world or in the world to come."
Schowgurow v. State, 213 A.2d 475, 478 (Md. Ct. App. 1965) (quoting Article 36 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights). In Schowgurow, the court noted that it was common practice for citizens to be
questioned orally and in writing about their belief in God before their names were even placed on juror
lists. Id. at 479. The court then went on to hold that the state constitutional provision, which had the
effect of making belief in God a prerequisite for jury service, violated the Federal Constitution. Id. at
482.
To avoid the argument that making jurors take oaths constitutes an impermissible religious
qualification for jury service, some courts have interpreted their State's statutory provisions so as to
permit affirmations instead. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Nev. 1978) (permitting jurors
to affirm in lieu of an oath so that religious groups were not excluded from jury service); Jenke v. State,
487 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (ruling that an affirmation could be substituted for an oath
so that atheists and agnostics are not prohibited from serving on juries because of their religious
choosing).
205. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771. Earlier in the opinion, the court asserted that the prevalence (or lack
thereof) of religious discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges should be dispositive of the
issue:
If the life of the law were logic rather than experience, Batson might well be extended to
include religious bias and, for that matter, an endless number of other biases. The question,
however, is whether the peremptory strike has been purposefully employed to perpetuate
religious bigotry to the extent that the institutional integrity of the jury has been impaired, and
thus requiring further modification of the traditional peremptory challenge.
Id. at 769-70 (footnote omitted).
206. Id. at 771. In a footnote, the J.E.B. Court implicitly suggests that the differences in history
might provide a mechanism for continuing to adhere to its positions in Batson and J.E.B. while refusing
to extend those cases to religion. After holding that parties may not rely on gender stereotypes when
exercising peremptory challenges, the Court stated:
The popular refrain is that all peremptory challenges are based on stereotypes of some
kind, expressing various intuitive and frequently erroneous biases .... But where peremptory
challenges are made on the basis of group characteristics other than race or gender (like
occupation, for example), they do not reinforce the same stereotypes about the group's
competence or predispositions that have been used to prevent them from voting, participating
on juries, pursuing their chosen professions, or otherwise contributing to civic life.
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The impact of the particular type of discrimination on the integrity of our
jury trial system provides one final justification for drawing the line between
race and gender, on one hand, and religion, on the other. The Batson Court
chose to disallow the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a
particular race in part because of its concern for the institutional reputation
of the judicial system. The Court noted that "public respect for our criminal
justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no
citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race. 2 °7 The J.E.B.
Court similarly expressed concern for the integrity of the system should courts
continue to permit strikes based upon gender. In this regard, the Court stated
its belief that "[d]iscriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the
impression that the judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full
participation by one gender.
2 8
This concern for integrity, however, does not apply with equal force when
asserted in the context of determining the constitutionality of religion-based
peremptory challenges. One cannot say, as in the context of race and gender,
that religious stereotyping in the jury selection process is so pervasive and has
sufficient negative impact on the public's perception of the judicial system to
warrant prohibition of religion-based peremptory challenges. In this context,
the goal of seating an impartial jury and the role that religion-based
peremptory challenges conceivably play in achieving this goal outweigh
concerns for the integrity of the judicial system.2 9 The Minnesota Supreme
Court in Davis cited this point in its refusal to extend Batson to religion:
The use of the peremptory strike to discriminate purposefully on the
basis of religion does not ... appear to be common and flagrant .... This
is not to say that religious intolerance does not exist in our society, but
only to say that there is no indication that irrational religious bias so
pervades the peremptory challenge as to undermine the integrity of the jury
system.
210
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 n.14 (1994) (second emphasis added) (citations
omitted). The source cited by the Court to support this statement also points to history as a potential
dividing line between race and gender, on the one hand, and religion, on the other. See Babcock, supra
note 48, at 1173.
207. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986).
208. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427.
209. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text; infra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
210. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771 (footnote omitted). A dissenting judge in another case demonstrates
that this conclusion is not without its critics:
Given the historic human tendency to be intolerant with respect to religion, and given the great
diversity of the religious faiths of our citizens, and the importance that our citizens place on
religious faith, I would suggest that discrimination in jury selection on the basis of religion is
as repugnant to our ideals and has the potential to be as socially disruptive as racial
discrimination if it is allowed to continue.
Casarez v. State, 857 S.W.2d 779, 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (Hill, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 1994 WL
695868, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994). While Chief Justice Hill's conclusion ultimately
prevailed on appeal, the court of criminal appeals plurality decision did not engage in a comparison of
racial and religious discrimination, though it did discuss religious discrimination in isolation. See
Casarez, 1994 WL at *6-7 (plurality opinion).
One student author agrees that public confidence in the judicial system is not undermined by the
exercise of peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation. See Michael J. Plati, Comment,
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Thus, there are tenable and persuasive ways in which the Court's holding
in Batson and its extension to gender in J.E.B. can be reconciled with the
argument that the Constitution should not similarly be held to prohibit
religion-based peremptory challenges. This argument is further strengthened
when one considers the practical implications which might result from a
contrary ruling.
C. Extending Batson and J.E.B. to Religion:
A Practically Problematic Proposition
Beneath the constitutional considerations lie the practical ramifications.
Once the constitutional argument for curtailing religion-based peremptory
challenges is cast aside, these ramifications are exposed, and upon considering
them, the balance tips further in favor of preserving the peremptory challenge
in its present form, protecting it from further erosion in the context of
religion. In opposing the extension of Batson to gender, the State of Alabama
recognized this; and, despite the fact that the Court rejected this assertion, the
point should not be forgotten when considering the issue of religion: extension
"would cause 'a great number more problems than it fixes. ' ' '2 11
1. Identifying "Religion-Based" Challenges and
"Religion-Neutral" Reasons
Setting aside the actual constitutional mechanics and the distinctions which
warrant a different result in the context of religion, further practical issues
confront courts that extend Batson and J.E.B. to religion. Courts that reject
the distinctions previously noted and find such an extension warranted will
likely implement those procedures set forth in Batson and J.E.B. to determine
whether peremptory challenges have been exercised in a religiously discrimi-
natory manner.2 12 In accordance with the formulations set forth by the
Supreme Court in Batson and J.E.B., the party alleging that the strikes are
religion-based would first be required to make a prima facie showing that the
opposing party intentionally discriminated by basing its peremptory challenge
on the religion of the challenged prospective juror. The party who exercised
the peremptory challenge would then bear the burden of explaining the basis
for the challenge. While this explanation need not rise to the level of a
challenge for cause in order to be accepted by the court, the party must satisfy
Religion-based Peremptory Strikes and the Arizona Constitution: Can They Coexist?, 26 ARiz. ST. LJ.
883, 894 (1994). Plati suggests this after asserting, "Although religious conflicts have gained a similar
social importance in other areas of the world, their impact on American society is minimal at present"
Id. It is interesting to note, however, that Plati ultimately concludes that both the U.S. Constitution and
the Arizona Constitution prohibit religion-based peremptory challenges after examining other factors he
deems to have been critical in the race and gender cases. Id. at 895.
211. Biskupic, supra note 136, at A3 (quoting Alabama Assistant Attorney General Lois N. Brasfield
during oral argument in J.E.B.).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 1-72, 118-19.
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the court that the challenge was based on a characteristic other than
religion."' In other words, the challenging party must offer a "religion-
neutral" reason for exercising the peremptory challenge. While it appears that
implementation of the procedures articulated in Batson and J.E.B. has not, as
some had forecast, been unworkable,214 utilizing these procedures in the
context of religion-based challenges will prove problematic for trial courts as
well as for litigants.1
Under this procedure, the party whose peremptory strike is challenged under
a rule extending Batson and J.E.B. to religion will encounter practical
difficulties. If courts extend Batson and J.E.B. to religion, this party will have
two options, both of which are undesirable and problematic. The party might
first attempt to articulate a religion-neutral reason to support his challenge. As
Sarokin and Munsterman argue, however, "this requirement will not end the
objectionable practices but will merely compel lawyers to be more creative in
finding reasons for excluding potential jurors." '216 Furthermore, there are
several limitations on gathering information about prospective jurors before
and during the jury selection process. 217 Therefore, it might prove difficult
for the party exercising the objectionable peremptory challenge to formulate
and articulate a religion-neutral reason sufficient to justify the peremptory
challenge.
The party attempting to exercise the allegedly impermissible peremptory
challenge might instead try to convert the peremptory into a challenge for
213. As noted infra text accompanying notes 226-27, neither Batson nor J.E.B. provide clear
indications of how this new "religion-neutral" requirement would be satisfied. The guidance offered by
the Court in Batson regarding the sufficiency of an asserted race-neutral reason is discussed supra text
accompanying notes 68-72. According to the J.E.B. Court, a gender-neutral reason "need not rise to the
level of a 'for cause' challenge" in order to be sufficient. "[l]t merely must be based on a juror
characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual." J.E.B., 114 S.
Ct. at 1430.
214. See, e.g., J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1429 ("The experience in the many jurisdictions that have barred
gender-based challenges belies the claim that litigants and trial courts are incapable of complying with
a rule barring strikes based on gender."); Chemerinsky, supra note 165, at 73 (noting that "although
Batson has significantly changed trial practice, it has not proven unworkable). But see J.E.B., 114 S.
Ct. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that by extending Batson to gender, "the Court
increases the number of cases in which jury selection-once a sideshow-will become part of the main
event"); id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting'that a consequence of the Court's holding "is a
lengthening of the voir dire process that already burdens trial courts"); Chemerinsky, supra note 165,
at 73 (stating that "[1]awyers and trial judges will struggle... with how to implement J.E.B. for years
to come").
215. This problem of implementation was also raised by the State of Alabama in opposing the
extension of Batson to gender during oral argument in J.E.B. See Arguments Before the Court: Courts
and Procedure, supra note 106, at 3330. While it was rejected in that context, the argument nevertheless
has its own vitality when considered in the different context of religion.
216. H. Lee Sarokin & G. Thomas Munsterman, Recent Innovations in Civil Jury Trial Procedures,
in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM, supra note 48, at 383. This point is supported by the
observation that "[l]awyers use laundry lists of 'whatever-neutral' explanations to plug into the second-
step of the Batson 'three-step danse macabre,' and these laundry lists are even taught at CLE seminars."
Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *17 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (McCormick,
J., dissenting).
217. For instance, in the federal system, the list of prospective jurors may be kept confidential until
the day of trial unless the case involves treason or a capital offense. STARR & McCORMICK, supra note
4, § 3.84 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1988)). This precludes parties from conducting pre-voir dire
investigations to gather information about prospective jurors. See supra note 13.
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cause. In so doing, the party might find it necessary during voir dire to probe
beyond the religious affiliation label into the area of that faith's particular
belief system and doctrinal convictions. Such attempts to probe, however, are
problematic in two respects. First, the trial judge's discretion governs the
nature and scope of voir dire.2 ' Many courts have thus held that, as a
general rule, questioning a prospective juror about his religious beliefs is
improper; this general rule is inapplicable only when the case involves a
religious party or issue." 9 One text advising practitioners recognizes this
general rule and cautions that "[r]eligious bias ... is not a permissible area
of inquiry except in rare instances."22
Attempting to turn an allegedly impermissible peremptory strike into a
challenge for cause gives rise to yet another difficulty. As previously noted,
a party must satisfy a fairly rigorous standard in order to successfully
challenge a prospective juror for cause.22' In order to satisfy this standard,
the party will likely utilize voir dire questioning (if permitted by that
particular court) to delve into the juror's religious affiliation and beliefs in an
effort to demonstrate to the court that the affiliation and beliefs render the
juror impermissibly partial or biased. The deep and probing questioning
necessary to elicit responses which support a challenge for cause might,
however, offend the juror to whom it is directed.222 According to one
218. See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S 415,423-24 (1991); see also State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767,
772 (Minn. 1993) (noting that "[t]he trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, controls the questions
that can be asked to keep the voir dire within relevant bounds"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 143 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that, because
religious questioning violates jurors' privacy interests and because religion had no bearing on any aspect
of the case, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to question jurors about their religion), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 56, 63 (4th Cir.) (finding that, in
a case involving failure to file income tax returns, it was not error for the trial court to fail to inquire
about jurors' religious affiliations), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956); State v. Via, 704 P.2d 238, 248
(Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (asserting that, because "even relevant questions about religion cannot be
considered in a vacuum isolated from their impact upon the privacy interests of venire members," the
lower court did not err in refusing to question jurors about religious preference and church service
attendance patterns where the issues and facts of the case did not involve religion), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1048 (1986); State v. Velarde, 616 P.2d 104, 105 (Colo. 1980) (holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in failing to inquire into jurors' religious beliefs during voir dire); cf. Hornsby v.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 758 P.2d 929,
933 (Utah App.) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to allow parties
to question jurors concerning their religious affiliation where a religious organization was a party to the
case), cert. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988). The court in Davis also noted that voir dire questioning
is and should be limited.in this respect. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 772.
These cases are relevant to the debate over the propriety of constitutionally prohibiting religion-based
peremptory challenges in one other respect. Their holdings on the issue of the proper scope of voir dire
questioning implicitly suggest that, in some cases, religion does matter, they imply that religion is, in
fact, a helpful and legitimate consideration in attempting to seat an impartial jury. One might argue,
therefore, that these courts implicitly support and uphold the use of religion-based peremptory challenges
in certain circumstances. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text (discussing the premise that
religion is more likely to be a predictor of juror attitudes than race and gender and may actually
influence a juror's ability to be impartial).
220. WENKE, supra note 154, at 79.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
222. A similar argument was made by Chief Justice Burger in his Batson dissent:
Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike will build records in support of their claims that
peremptory challenges have been exercised in a racially discriminatory fashion by asking jurors
to state their racial background and national origin for the record, despite the fact that "such
questions may be offensive to some jurors and thus are not ordinarily asked on voir dire."
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observer, this was, in fact, the way in which Justice Ginsburg indicated that
she might distinguish race and gender from religion during oral argument in
J.E.B.: "She noted that sex or race is immediately noticeable, but said that to
determine religion ... may require an attorney to delve too deeply into a
prospective juror's personal life. 223 In Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court
thought this was an unnecessary price to pay, noting that a rule extending
Batson to the context of religion would invite voir dire questioning "exces-
sively intrusive for the end sought to be achieved." '224 The offense that may
result from such questioning might actually be more severe than any affront
an excluded juror might feel as the result of being challenged on the basis of
his religion.225 In this way, therefore, an extension of Batson and J.E.B. to
religion invites intrusive questioning on the part of the party exercising the
challenge, which is perhaps more trouble than it is worth.
If courts do extend Batson and J.E.B. to the context of religion, they will
confront additional problems as they endeavor to apply the new rule. Trial
judges will be forced to grapple with the task of determining what reasons
might satisfy the new religion-neutral requirement. The guidelines set forth
in Batson and J.E.B. provide little assistance. As Chief Justice Burger noted
in his Batson dissent, "A 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of
'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenge will be difficult to distinguish
from a challenge for cause."22 Writing for the Court in J.E.B., Justice
Blackmun stated only that a party charged with using gender-based peremp-
tory challenges must offer an explanation "based on a juror characteristic
other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual."'
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 129-30 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting
People v. Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 180 (1985)).
223. Arguments Before the Court: Courts and Procedure, supra note 106, at 3330. In clarifying the
dissent's portrayal of the Minnesota Supreme Court's Davis opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that this
was one of the Davis court's key observations. See Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I write only to note that the dissent's portrayal of the Minnesota Supreme
Court is incomplete. That court made two key observations:... (2) 'Ordinarily.... inquiry on voir dire
into a juror's religious affiliation and belief is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions is
improper") (quoting Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 772), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993).
224. Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771.
225. This point is important to note, because the Court in Batson and J.E.B. placed great emphasis
on the affront that race- and gender-based challenges cause to the excluded juror. Avoidance of such
affronts was an integral component in the Court's decisions to prohibit peremptory challenges based on
race and gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1428 (1994); Batson, 476 U.S.
at 87.
The Court's concern with the potential affront to the excluded juror, however, does not seem well-
founded in the context of race and gender and seems even less convincing in the context of religion.
The very nature of the peremptory challenge dictates that no reason need be given for its exercise. See
supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. It is thus unlikely that a peremptorily challenged juror will
know why a party chose to excuse' him; the prospective juror is not told that he was challenged on the
basis of his race, gender, or religion. By simply paying attention to the course of voir dire, however,
the excluded juror may be able to ascertain that he was challenged on the basis of his race or gender.
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that it will be evident to him that he was challenged on the basis of his
religious affiliation.
226. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
227. J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1430.
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The problem of defining what would constitute a sufficient religion-neutral
reason stems from the deeper problem of what, in fact, would constitute an
impermissible religion-based peremptory challenge. There are three types of
challenges which might earn such a label: those based upon affiliation with
a particular religious denomination, those based upon the general strength and
conviction of a person's religious faith, and those based upon an individual
juror's indication during voir dire that his particular religious beliefs are
relevant to the issues involved in the case at bar.
When exercising the first type of religion-based challenge, an attorney relies
on a series of assumptions. He must first know the religion with which a
particular juror identifies and then assume that his knowledge concerning that
particular faith, its belief system, and its practices is correct. He must also
assume that the juror who espouses such a faith is representative of the faith
and personally embraces its beliefs and engages in its practices. Finally, the
attorney must presume that the juror.will be influenced in a particular way by
those beliefs and practices.
Davis provides an example of the first type of potential religion-based
challenge.228 There, when asked to provide a race-neutral reason for
excluding a particular juror, the State cited the fact that the juror was a
Jehovah's Witness.2 9 The State then reasoned that members of that faith "'are
reluctant to exercise authority over their fellow human beings."' 0 In
challenging that particular juror, the State was obviously making the final
assumption: that the juror, like other Jehovah's Witnesses, would be unable
to judge the defendant and was therefore a partial juror.
The second type of potential religion-based challenge might arise, for
example, when a defense attorney attempts to strike a juror who indicates that
he attends church every Sunday and two additional times per week. The
attorney's challenge is likely based on the assumption that the rigidity and
structure evidenced by the juror's behavior indicates that the juror might be
inflexible and intolerant of those who break the law or violate society's
norms.23' The attorney might thus conclude that the juror is likely neither
impartial nor able to be.
An example of the third candidate which could be designated as an
impermissible religion-based challenge would occur in cases involving issues
which are emotionally or politically charged and about which people tend to
hold strong views, such as abortion. An attorney representing a doctor
prosecuted for performing a third trimester abortion will likely seek to
peremptorily challenge a juror who expresses a religious conviction that
abortion constitutes murder.232 The attorney might legitimately question
whether such a juror is capable of serving impartially and viewing the
228. See supra text accompanying note 129.
229. State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 768 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
230. Id. (quoting from the record).
23 1. For examples of this type of religion-based assumption, see supra text accompanying notes 152-
54.
232. I would like to thank Professor Daniel 0. Conke for providing this example.
1995]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
evidence and parties in an unbiased manner. The attorney might thus choose
to exercise a peremptory challenge to exclude this prospective juror.?23
If Batson and J.E.B. are extended to prohibit religion-based peremptory
challenges absent a neutral explanation for their exercise, which of these types
of challenges would be deemed constitutionally impermissible? An extension
of Batson and J.E.B. to religion would require a definitive answer if the new
rule is to be workable in its new context.234 If the first type of challenge is
classified as religion-based and therefore constitutionally impermissible, the
opponent to the challenge can make the requisite prima facie showing simply
by demonstrating that Catholics, Methodists, Buddhists, or jurors belonging
to other religious groups are being excluded by exercise of the peremptory
challenge.
However, the question as to what qualifies as a "religion" under this new
rule would then inevitably arise. Would it be akin to the Supreme Court's
treatment of the issue in its conscientious objector cases, where it has
construed the term "religion" broadly?235 Formulating the definition of
"religion" might prove to be problematic for purposes of this new rule when
one considers that any belief system which addresses the meaning of life,
ultimate concerns, or humanity's place in the universe might, in some
people's lives, constitutes religion.236
The fact that extending Batson and J.E.B. to religion would require courts
to determine what exactly constitutes religion presents one further concern.
Under the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,237 activities violate the First Amendment's prohibition against
233. One might question why the doctor's attorney would not simply challenge this prospective juror
for cause, arguing that the prospective juror's expressed conviction sufficiently supports such a
challenge. Problems with this argument are addressed infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
234. Unless and until lower courts determine what precisely constitutes a religion-based peremptory
challenge, the interim period of ambiguity could conceivably invite requests for a religion-neutral
explanation for every peremptory challenge. These requests will in turn unnecessarily complicate voir
dire. See Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (holding that the applicable test for
determining "religious" exemptions to the draft law was "whether a given belief that is sincere and
meaningfuil occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption"). If this broad meaning of religion becomes part
of the rule restricting peremptory challenges based on religion, it follows that many Batson-like religion-
based objections will likely result.
236. See ADAMS & EMMERICK, supra note 192, at 93. As such, one could argue that Epicureanism,
nihilism, solipsism, and materialism are all "religions," and, therefore, that challenges based upon such
belief systems are impermissible. See id.
One of the dissenting judges in Casarez also raised the issue of defining the boundaries of religion
and the problems such a definition might pose for a new rule barring religion-based peremptory
challenges. After noting that religion is marked by shared beliefs in principles, doctrines, or rules, Judge
Meyers observed: "The treatment of religious creed as an inappropriate basis for peremptory exclusion
cannot rationally be distinguished from a similar treatment of persons on account of their Libertarian
politics, their advocacy of communal living, or their membership in the Flat Earth Society." Casarez v.
State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868, at *20 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14, 1994) (Meyers, J., dissenting).
From this observation Judge Meyers concluded that "the extension of Balson to religious belief" cannot
be reconciled "without also extending it to constitutionally protected beliefs of other kinds." Id.
237. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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governmental establishment of religion23 when they excessively entangle
government and religion.239 If courts hold that challenges of the first type
noted above are religion-based and therefore constitutionally impermissible,
courts would be required to conduct inquiries into the nature of particular
beliefs and to make decisions regarding whether such beliefs are religious in
order to determine what meaning "religion" has for purposes of administering
the new rule. The judiciary's hand in making this determination could very
well constitute excessive entanglement and thus give rise to an Establishment
Clause challenge under Lemon. Religion and the administration of justice
would become inextricably intertwined if Batson and J.E.B. were extended to
prohibit the first type of challenge because such an extension will necessarily
require courts to become involved in the practical application of the rule.
Furthermore, with the first type of challenge, what would constitute a
sufficient religion-neutral reason?.4 ° During voir dire in Davis, the defen-
dant did not attack the State's religion-based reasoning or ask for a religion-
neutral explanation. If he had, however, would the State's reasoning have
sufficed?21 If, in fact, reluctance to judge others is a belief embraced by the
Jehovah's Witness faith, might this instead provide an adequate basis for a
challenge for cause?242 Would a religion-neutral reason in this context be
one unrelated just to the religious denomination, or must it be devoid of any
reference to religiosity and associated beliefs all together?
Labeling the second type of challenge religion-based and thereby forbidding
it under this new rule would present problems as well. Such a determination
suggests that not only is discrimination based upon one's particular religion
banned, but so too is discriminating against a juror because he is religious.
Again, this will invite a flood of objections to peremptory challenges, 243
and, as with the first type of potentially impermissible religion-based
challenge, courts would then confront the difficult task of delineating which
explanations, in fact, are unrelated to religiosity and are therefore sufficient
to overcome a prima facie showing of discrimination. 2" If such a challenge
238. See supra note 162.
239. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
240. The court in Davis did, in fact, anticipate the difficulty of determining what might constitute
a religion-neutral reason: "[When religious beliefs translate into judgments on the merits of the cause
to be judged, it is difficult to distinguish, in challenging a juror, between an impermissible bias on the
basis of religious affiliation and a permissible religion-neutral explanation." State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 771 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
241. The State's reasoning is quoted supra at text accompanying note 129.
242. The Davis court raised this issue by asking whether "the explanation that the juror was
'reluctant to exercise authority over their [sic] fellow human beings' [would] be sufficient to overcome
a prima facie case of religious bias." Davis, 504 N.W.2d at 771.
Of course, the attorney wishing to exercise a peremptory challenge on this basis might focus his voir
dire questioning on the individual's particular beliefs. As earlier noted, however, this approach is
problematic in two respects. First, some courts as a general rule do not permit parties to ask prospective
jurors about religious affiliation and beliefs. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. Second, when
courts do permit such questioning, prospective jurors might feel that it is unnecessarily intrusive and
probing. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 234.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
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is deemed to fall within those which would be prohibited by an extension of
Batson and J.E.B. to religion, the problem of entanglement might also again
be a factor because of the role courts would inevitably play in administering
the new rule.245
Finally, several concerns would emerge if courts hold that the third type of
challenge noted above is religion-based and therefore constitutionally
impermissible. Prohibiting challenges of this type ignores the reality that, in
some cases, religion does matter and can serve as an accurate proxy for a
prospective juror's ability to be impartial and unbiased in a particular
case.246 While this type of challenge can be said to have its basis in the
prospective juror's religious beliefs, banning the doctor's ability to peremp-
torily challenge the juror could potentially violate the doctor's constitutional
right to an impartial jury and would also undermine his confidence in the
system and his belief that he was given a fair trial.247 If precluded from
peremptorily challenging this juror by a rule that extends Batson and J.E.B.
to religion, the attorney might feel forced to attempt to challenge the
prospective juror for cause. However, because the trial judge would not be
likely to simply accept expression of this belief as a sufficient showing to
support a challenge for cause,245 the attorney may be forced to engage in
questioning which might seem unduly intrusive or offensive to the juror.249
If, after such questioning, the trial judge denies the challenge for cause and
this type of religion-based peremptory challenge has been banned by the
extension of Batson and J.E.B., the attorney will be left with a juror who is
likely hostile toward him, and, as a result, toward his client.250
2. Stripping the Peremptory of Its Useful Functions
Yet another adverse consequence would arise if courts extend the prohibi-
tions of Batson and J.E.B. to religion-based peremptory challenges. Such an
extension would further curtail the free, uninhibited use of the peremptory
challenge and encroach upon its traditional nature. An extension of Batson
and J.E.B. to religion would undermine several of the extolled virtues of the
peremptory challenge and thereby prevent the peremptory challenge from
performing some of its most useful and vital functions in the jury selection
process.25'
245. See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the assertion that religion
may reflect a prospective juror's ability to serve impartially and in an unbiased manner.
247. See supra notes 36-41, 49-52 and accompanying text.
248. This might be true because courts typically grant challenges for cause only in very limited
situations. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21, 43.
249. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways in which the
challenge can serve as a "shield" against such hostility.
25 1. For a general discussion of the valuable functions performed by the peremptory challenge, see
supra part II.A.
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First and foremost, an extension of Batson and J.E.B. to religion would
diminish the ability of the peremptory challenge to assist in assuring that an
impartial jury is seated. Plainly, in some cases an attorney's underlying
assumptions about particular religions are clearly unsupported, overbroad
generalizations.252 The attorney, however, would be failing in his role as
advocate by ignoring the very real possibility that, in some instances, ajuror's
religion may hinder that juror's ability to hear the evidence and decide the
case impartially. Given the nature of religion, it would be erroneous to totally
disregard the notion that a juror might occasionally be improperly influenced
by his particular religious affiliation and beliefs.253 Some courts have
implicitly acknowledged this reality by allowing voir dire questions con-
cerning a prospective juror's religion only in cases that involve a religious
issue or a party affiliated with a religious organization or denomination.254
When a juror does have the potential to be partial or biased because of his
religious affiliation and beliefs, it is likely to go unexposed for a variety of
reasons. For instance, the juror himself may not realize that his religious
affiliation or beliefs may have an adverse impact on his ability to impartially
view the case -and evaluate the evidence and may influence him in the jury
room deliberations.255 The uninhibited peremptory challenge is a useful tool
in guarding against such "unacknowledged or unconscious bias. 256 More
likely is the possibility that a juror simply will not admit, in open court, that
his religion could have a bearing on his ability to be impartial. 257 A juror
may not realize until he sees the evidence and hears the testimony that his
religion may improperly influence his decision-making ability. Furthermore,
potential religious biases may go unexplored because of the general tendency
of some courts to prohibit any questioning of jurors regarding their religious
beliefs.258 Similarly, attorneys may choose not to probe into the area of
religion when conducting voir dire because of the prospect that "[p]ointed
questions directed at an area as sensitive as a potential juror's ... religious
252. For an example of poor judgment in choosing to rely on a clearly questionable religious
stereotype, see Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc). In offering a race-
neutral reason for a peremptory challenge, the prosecutor in Whitsey opined that the Pentecostal juror
against whom the challenge was being exercised belonged to a faith whose members "sometimes feel
that they speak in tongues, therefore, becoming a fringe religious group." Id. at 711.
253. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
255. See People v. McCray, 443 N.E.2d 915, 917-18 (N.Y. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961 (1983);
see also Horwitz, supra note 35, at 1402.
256. Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1981).
257. See McCray, 443 N.E.2d at 917-18; see also Horwitz, supra note 35, at 1402 (noting that
prospective jurors might not express religious beliefs during voir dire if they think such beliefs may be
socially unacceptable). The possibility that a juror might not speak up if he feels that religion might
affect his ability to be impartial is supported by one author's observation of American culture and
religion: "[W]e have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other
than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter
to them." CARTER, supra note 184, at 3.
258. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. Courts' reluctance to allow jurors to be
questioned about their religion was summed up by one court as follows: "As to religion, our jury
selections system was not designed to subject prospective jurors to a catechism of their tenets of faith
.... United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980).
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... biases may ... alienate a juror against counsel and his position." '259 As
a result, attorneys often ask the entire panel whether any juror's ability to be
impartial might be affected by his religious affiliation.
Finally, if the court does permit (and an attorney does ask) questions which
could reveal potential religious biases or prejudices, the jurors' answers might
fail to lay a sufficient foundation for a challenge for cause. Challenges for
cause are very strictly construed.26 Without a realistic opportunity to
conduct a more in-depth inquiry into potential improper religious influence,
an attorney may not be able to actually pinpoint and articulate why a
challenge for cause based upon religion is warranted. And, if the attorney
does attempt to do so by trying to demonstrate religious bias via questioning
only to have the challenge for cause denied, the juror, given the probing and
intrusive nature of the questions regarding his religious affiliation, will likely
be hostile toward the attorney and the party he represents. 261 The peremptory
challenge can then be used to guard against the chance that this hostility will
adversely affect the juror's ability to impartially analyze the case.
In this respect, religion is unlike many other attributes upon which attorneys
often base their peremptory challenges. Race and gender are visually
ascertainable. A court is not likely to prohibit questioning of a juror
concerning his occupation and how it may affect his ability to serve as an
impartial juror. Thus, there is a special need to allow the free, uninhibited use
of the peremptory challenge, even when it is used to exclude jurors of
particular faiths or beliefs. This is true not because stereotypes regarding
different religions and beliefs are correct, but instead because every other tool
of voir dire is an ineffective means of ferreting out those situations in which
potential religious biases and prejudices may exist.
Extending Batson and J.E.B. to religion, therefore, deprives voir dire of the
one tool-the peremptory challenge-that can accomplish such a task. Without
that tool, the parties will be reluctant during voir dire to explore potential
religious biases and prejudices that may, in some cases, be of legitimate
concern. If the religion-based peremptory challenge were eliminated, the other
mechanisms of voir dire could not be relied upon to root out even the few
jurors whose religious affiliation might hinder their ability to be impartial.
3. Preventing Further Erosion of the Peremptory Challenge
Extending Batson and J.E.B. to religion would give rise to one final
practical ramification, one which should perhaps be the most disturbing. Such
an extension would further erode the traditional nature of the peremptory
challenge and expose the challenge to a rapid downward slide into extinction.
In J.E.B., the Court refuted the assertion that an extension of Batson to gender
259. McCray, 443 N.E.2d at 918.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21, 43.
261. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
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signals the demise of the peremptory challenge.262 The Court instead stated
that parties may still base peremptory challenges on attributes which are
subject to rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.2 63 Thus,
in theory, while an extension of Batson and J.E.B. to religion would not
technically expose the peremptory challenge to extinction, as a practical
matter, such an extension would call for a redefinition of the term "peremp-
tory challenge." Extending Batson and J.E.B. to religion would render even
more inaccurate the traditional description of the peremptory challenge as one
exercised "without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject
to the court's control."26 Placing religion within the rubric of Batson and
J.E.B. would render the label "peremptory challenge" and what it has
traditionally connoted devoid of any meaningful content and would further
remove it from its traditional nature. Justice Scalia acknowledged this reality
during oral argument in J.E.B. when, at the prospect of extending protection
to jurors based on attributes beyond race and gender, he retorted, "'What
would be left? ... The postman and people with blond hair."'265
In order for this threatened erosion to be a viable and persuasive argument
against such an extension, however, one must be convinced that the current
nature of the peremptory, as modified by Batson and J.E.B., is, in fact,
something worth saving from such a fate.2 66 Clearly, the peremptory
challenge is not a perfect creature. Nevertheless, its historical roots, its
recognition by courts and commentators as an integral and valuable aspect of
the jury selection process, and the useful functions that it serves267 suggest
that further encroachments which alter its traditional nature should be viewed
and scrutinized with serious skepticism. For it is the traditional nature of the
peremptory challenge-the fact that it can be exercised without explanation-
that allows the challenge to serve those functions for which it has been
commended. As one observer notes, "In order to carry out these critical
functions properly, the unfettered use of the peremptory challenge is
necessary. As Blackstone noted over two hundred years ago, the peremptory
challenge is "'an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be exercised with
262. J.E.B.v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994) ("Our conclusion that litigants may
not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory
challenges.").
263. Id. Even before the Court's implicit ratification in J.E.B. of peremptory challenges based upon
age, lower courts had rejected attempts to argue that Batson should be extended to this attribute. See
United States v. Pichay, 986 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d
538 (Ist Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
264. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986).
265. Biskupic, supra note 136, at A3 (quoting Justice Scalia during oral argument in J.E.B.).
266. Indeed, some would not be troubled by abolition of the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Batson,
476 U.S. at 108 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("(O]nly by banning peremptories entirely can such
discrimination be ended."); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge ShouldBeAbolished,
65 TEMP. L. REv. 369 (1992); Sarokin & Munsterman, supra note 216, at 382 (providing three reasons
why, for practical and principled purposes, the peremptory challenge should be eliminated, particularly
in civil trials).
267. See supra part II.A.
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full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.' ' 268 Clearly, in light of Batson
and J.E.B., the use of peremptory challenges can no longer be accurately
described as "unfettered." Nonetheless, while the compelling need to eradicate
racial and gender discrimination and the inaccuracy of using those attributes
as proxies for juror impartiality justified curtailment of the free, uninhibited
use of the peremptory challenge in those contexts, the line can and should be
drawn at religion if the peremptory is to maintain its vital role in the jury
selection process.
CONCLUSION
After much anticipation by lower courts, scholars, and other commentators,
the Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. not only broadened the
extent of the holding in Batson and its principles of equal protection beyond
the context of race, but the Court also added gender to the list of attributes
which the Constitution prohibits from serving as the basis of peremptory
challenges. The issue that loomed in the backdrop while the Court considered
J.E.B. is now at the forefront of the debate regarding the constitutionally
permissible scope of the peremptory challenge. J.E.B. failed to resolve
affirmatively the issue of whether peremptory challenges based upon religious
affiliation are barred by the Constitution, as are those based on race and
gender. The Court's denial of the petition for certiorari in State v. Davis
further demonstrates that the issue remains unresolved.
The peremptory challenge thus faces a very uncertain future. In considering
what shape this future should take with regard to religion, the whittling away
of the peremptory challenge can and should be halted. Constitutional
considerations do not warrant extension of Batson and J.E.B. to religion, and
the practical implications of such an extension counsel against the adoption
of a rule whereby religion-based peremptory challenges must be explained. A
line which is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable can be drawn to preclude such
an extension. While the outcome is justifiably different where race and gender
are involved, in the context of religion and the clash of rights, the need to
secure impartiality in trial by jury should triumph.
Nevertheless, while the Constitution may not be a barrier to religion-based
peremptory challenges, an attorney's own sense of reality and decency should
serve as a check on the improper exercise of such challenges. In a profession
that takes pride in its self-regulating nature, attorneys must realize the limited
assistance that notions about religions and religious practices provide in the
effort to seat an impartial jury, and they should act accordingly. While the
right to an impartial jury might prevail in the constitutional arena, jurors'
desire not to be summarily judged solely on the basis of their religious
affiliations should not be rendered meaningless in the everyday practice of
law.
268. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (quoting Blackstone).
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